A. Macdougall



H. McDougall

Before we proceed to the course, it will be necessary to lay down some rules, which may be found in the 3d Book of Sr Isaac Newtons Principia.

The first then is, that the causes we assign for the Phanomena in nature must be real, that they must be sufficient to explain what is intended by them, and that when found sufficient it is vain to seek for any other. The ancient Philosophers built fine Systems of Philosophy, but as the Hypothises on which they were built were false, the Systems of consequence were false.
Des Cartes System is equally erroneous, as the Suppositions on which he went were not founded on reality. But the Philosophy of Sr Isaac Newton which was built

on the known facts of the Laws of Motion and Gravitation, is more certain than any of the former. These facts were sufficient to account for all the Phanomena in nature, & consequently, it was vain to seek for any other.

The second rule is that similar causes produce similar effects. Thus if the dilatation & contraction of a muscle in the Thorax produce the act of breathing in a man, we may safely attribute it to the same cause in a beast.

The falling of a stone in Europe & in America is owing to similar causes.

The third rule is, that the qualities of Bodies, whose virtues cannot be encreased or diminished, which are in all Bodies on which we makes experiments, are to be accounted qualities of all Bodies. As Solidity, Impenetrability, and Extension are found in Bodies on which we make experiments, these are to be esteemed universal qualities of Bodies.

The next & last rule is, that when from a number of Particulars, we infer a general fact applicable to each of these, this fact may be applied to all similar particulars. If we find that a certain degree of heat will fuse a certain quantity of metal of any kind, we may infer that the same degree of heat will fuse a like quantity of the same metal.

These rules apply equally well to Physical and moral Science & Should the Husbandman conclude that the Fertility of his soil is owing to the influence of the air alone, & depend on it wholly for the richness of his crop, he would be sadly disappointed at the coming of harvest. Thus have I laid before you these rules, the attending to which will be of the greatest consequence.

& But it is not enough that causes be true they must also be Adequate for

Lecture 2.

Science is divided into Physical and Moral, as has been observed. Physical is the knowledge of what is, Moral of what ought to be.

The particular observation of the four heads of Science, viz. Mechanism, Vegetation, Animal life, & Intelligence, will be of the utmost importance to us throughout the course, as there are facts in Vegetation, which cannot be explained by the principles of Mechanism, others in Animal Life, which cannot be explained by the Principles of either of the former, and others in Intelligence, which none of the three already mentioned can account for.

~~In proportion as~~ Whatever we love or desire we call good, and on the contrary ~~to every~~ whatever

~~[illegible]~~ ~~as~~ we hate or dislike, we call evil.

We shall first treat of Pneumatick, which in the most limited sense of the word ~~[illegible]~~ relates to the Human mind, but taken in a more extensive ~~sense~~ meaning ~~signifys~~ signifys mind in general, & so comprehends the Being & Attributes of God.

All things which are the subject of our enquiry are divided into Mind and Matter. The consciousness of Existence leads us to the knowledge of the former, ~~[illegible]~~ We discover the Existence of the latter, by means of our bodily organs ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~.

~~There are some however, who have been so fully convinced of an intelligent Power within them as to think all external objects imaginary.~~ But some ~~[illegible]~~ allege that as in the time of sleep we believe the appearances in a dream to be real, there may be some

future Period, when we shall be convinced of the nonentity of all external objects. Others again have been so conversant in the material world, as to run to ye other extreme, ye doubt of the Intellectual. Be this as it will, it leads us to observe a curious fact in the history of human nature, that men sometimes use those very things of which they doubt as arguments to support their doubt, and even doubt of things, the existence of which they cannot bring themselves to disbelieve.

There is another thing which leads us to the knowledge of mind, viz. the outward signs which are given us by nature; as for example, the human aspect, or the organization of Plants. If we see that the root of a Plant is intended to draw juices from the earth for the nourishment of it, the stem to convey these juices to the ramifications, foliage, blossom, fruit and

indeed, we must be sensible that there is some designing mind in the universe, which is the author of these.

Human nature is animal and intellectual. Animal nature is the subject of Anatomy & Physiology. It is the business of the Anatomist to enquire into the structure of the body, and the different parts which compose it. The Physiologist treats of the functions of these parts.

Intellectual nature is the proper subject of Pneumatics. but both being joined they equally respect Pneumatics & Physiology. I shall first speak of the History of the Species. It might seem more natural to treat of the individual before this, but as it is apt to launch out into things foreign to itself, we will reap more advantage

from that which I have proposed

In this, three principle things are to be observed, 1st what qualities we have in common wt other animals.

2ly by what we are distinguished from them, and

3ly by what we ourselves are distinguished.

The qualities which we have in common wt the other animals may be divided into three different kinds, viz. involuntary, voluntary, & one which partakes of the nature of both. one which partakes of the nature of both.

Among the involuntary we reckon ~~one~~ ~~[illegible]~~ digestion, the circulation of the blood, and such like.

The voluntary contains the motion of our limbs, the satisfying hunger, thirst, &c

Under that kind which has a part of both we may mention ~~the act of breathing~~ respiration.

This may be said to be involuntary, as we are born ~~to~~ it, and as it goes on ~~by~~ often about our being sensible of it; and likewise voluntary, as we can ~~stop it for some time, and let it return~~ dazzle or suspend it. I have heard ~~of an instance~~ of a man, who had this Power over the beating of his heart, & consequently the circulation of his blood, but as this is single, & ~~that too~~ not sufficiently ~~well~~ vouched, it is by no means to be considered as a fact in human nature.

Lecture 3

In many respects, man is like other animals; ~~in the same manner, it~~ like them he is generated & nourished, has his period of Life, and is subject to dissolution.

It is a fact which deserves our particular attention, that nature, tho' she does nothing in vain, delights rather in the

succession of the species than in prolonging the life of individuals; this observation applies equally well to some things in the inanimate world. Plants, for example, produce a much greater quantity of seed, than is necessary to keep up the different species; if this were not the case, the variety of accidents which are apt to befall the seed, would soon destroy them. (~~Of all other Species man is much subject to mortality~~ Typographical error) It appeared by some observations, which were made at London, that half the numbers who are born die, before ye third year, by others made afterwards at Paris before the seventh year. The difference of climate may occasion some variety in these two accounts, but as it is so great, this is not a sufficient reason for it;

it is more than probable that there has been some inaccuracy in the ~~computations~~ observations.

The longest lifes commonly consist of between seventy and one hundred years. This takes place among the rich and idle, the poor and laborious.

It appears from ye annual registes of deaths, that one of thirty two die each year; so if you multiply the number of deaths by 32 it will give the number of inhabitants.

It has likewise been found that for every 27 or 28 inhabitants there is a birth

Thus if you go thro' a process similar to the former, you will come to a similar conclusion.

In this part of the world the number of males & females is nearly equal, that of the males rather exceeding, ~~[illegible]~~ in the proportion of ~~[illegible]~~ 13 to 12

Travellers from Asia again tell us

that the proportion of females is much greater than that of males, particularly at Molaca, being as 22 to 18, & at Bantam as 10 to 1. It is probable there is a difference, ~~as~~ greater care ~~in rais~~ is taken of the females who are kept for the market, but it is so extraordinary that it must be attributed to the vast desire which travellers have to tell wonderful stories.

It is likewise observed that almost in every country, one fourth consists of men fit to carry arms, another of women, & a half of old men & children.

We come next to consider by what qualities man is distinguished from the other animals. The 1st which I shall mention is his aspect & erect Posture. Some writers who take pleasure in shewing the analogy between man & the other animals, carry the

matter so far as to think that the erect posture is not natural to man but only an acquired Habit. But if we consider the structure of the body, how well fitted it is for that posture, we ~~will~~ shall immediately reject that opinion. Man, says Mr Bouffon, stands on a much narrower base, than any other animal which shews that he is less connected wt the material world, & more wt the intellectual. The form of the feet, knees, intestines, & organs of sense all ~~concur~~ to convince us that man was intended to walk upright.

Lecture 4th

There are several other things which distinguish man from other animals; which tho they may appear defects are realy ~~marks~~ means of his superiority. He comes into the world with much greater difficulty than any other animal, which circumstance endears him more to his parents, & lays the foundation of a

future connection and friendship, which is ended by death alone.

Man is longer in a state of infancy & dependence than the brutes. but this defect is supplied by the care and attention of the mother. It ~~costs~~ exercises her thought to find out her infants wants, which it can only express by crying, but most other animals are in some measure able to shift for themselves as soon as they drop from their mother.

Instinct too is stronger in them than in man, but this is more than recompensed to him by the faculties of reason and invention.

Man is born naked, whereas the other ~~members of the creation~~ animals are furnished by nature with fur, hair, feathers, &c. This likewise is an advantage to him, for it tends to rouse his invention to supply himself w^t cloaths

necessary to defend him against the inclemency of the weather.

There is another circumstance, which distinguishes him from ye brutes, viz, that he is confined to no particular situation or climate but they have their range & fixed place of abode. He can remove to ye frigid, temperate or torrid zones wt little inconveniency; a few years reconcile him to any climate, he soon acquires a constitution fitted to that climate. But this is not the case wt other animals for the Lion, Ostrich, Eagle, and Tyger inhabitants of the torrid zone, the Horse, Deer Ox & Wolf of the temperate, the Raindeer Bear, and Ermine of the frigid were not intended to be removed from the range assigned them by nature.

Lecture 5th

I come now to mention two particulars which if taken seperately are to be found in other animals, but if together in man alone. He is at once an animal of prey and associating, whereas all other species are either animals of prey only, or associating. The sociable part of them are led by instinct to go in Herds, flocks, Coveys & Shoals, whether or not they can be of any use, to one another in ~~their~~ procuring their food. The animals of prey are led by the same instinct to shun ye company of one another; which may be attributed either to ye ferocity of their nature, or to some superior cause, lest they should destroy the other animals, & be an over match even for man himself. But man is endued wt reason to render him capable

of using both these gifts of nature.

In other animals of Prey, the only motive is to satisfy the craving of hunger but man delights to encounter dangers & difficulties in all his pursuits. & whether or not it may be thought an infelicity in human nature, it is a fact that man is ~~not~~ inclined to prey on man.

It hath been disputed in ye schools of Philosophy, whether man is naturally sociable, & ye long continuance of the dispute may occasion ~~an to extent~~ some doubt, with regard to this, but we will be immediately convinced, if we consider that a desire to associate is ~~[illegible]~~ coeval wt ye species.

There is another advantage which man has over other animals, viz, his talent of discourse. Without this, his love of

Society would be useless. I do not mean by this, the natural language, for ye the other animals are possessed of; they all have tones of distress and triumph. But this language which I speak of, is artificial, & consists of fixed & arbitrary Signs. It is remarkable that the brutes may be brought to understand this, but whether in ye same manner wth us, we never can come to know

Lecture 6th

This language is divided into 2 parts, articulate sounds, writing, & signs. The first is found in every Society of men, whether rude or civilized, but ye second is a later invention. The faculty of speech has been coeval wth the species, whereas writing is ingrafted on that & it is probable that Hieroglyphics were used before the invention of Letters.

It is ye excellency of ye European languages

that there is an Alphabet consisting of a certain number of letters, which ranged into different orders form all ye words which are used. But in China they have not this advantage as every word has different characters, which circumstance renders ye acquisition of learning so difficult in ye East, that a man, who can merely read & write is esteemed a scholar, & fitted for publick trusts.

I come now to treat of ye language of signs. This can be understood by deaf & dumb & in this likewise can ~~they~~ they converse. The Mutes in ye Seraglio at Constantinople where it is thought rude to speak aloud wtin ye precincts of the imperial Palace, are so expert at this, yt they can go through all ye arguments of a long dispute. We ought then out of charity to study this, as by it we may afford some ~~comfort~~ relief to ye deaf & dumb,

Case of the most wretched of all men, who are placed in midst of society, and not able to join in conversation by any other means, till they are taught to understand ye words of others from ye movements of the lips.

Man likewise distinguishes characters by epithets of praise & blame, and that among all nations, who as yet have been discovered. For ye opinions of those who think that those nations who have no words, to express virtue or vice, honesty or dishonesty, are void of those sentiments, have no foundation. The Greeks had two words to signify many things, for one among the Romans, or modern nations, but from this we are not to conclude, that the Greeks had more lively sentiments of these things than ye Romans or any of the modern nations.

This desire to praise & blame is innate in the species, for upon hearing a man named with whose character we are acquainted, we immediately pronounce him good or bad. And wherever there is society, there we may be assured will be Love and Hatred.

The state of nature is represented by some as a state of war and dissention, and man as a cruel and insociable animal, but this is mere imagination. We should not judge of him from his former, but from his present state. We see that Mankind is divided into nations, these into bands and tribes, some of which are joined in alliance, others at variance with one another. When the Persians made war against the states of Greece, these all combined against

the common foe. Again when one of the same states declared war against another of themselves, each had parties which adhered to them. From this we may conclude that the sentiments of friendship & enmity are found in the nature of man.

Lecture 7th

Thus I have shewn that Mankind is naturally inclined to join into bands and companies. Wherever there are families, they will form into more extensive societies, and these again into nations. The Kingdom of France, which formerly consisted of 100 independant states, is now under the same government, & subject to the same Laws. All the nations of Europe, now so free and powerful, were once subject to the Roman Empire. Individuals, seldom from choice,

are found to subsist alone. There have, however been some instances to the contrary, which are to be found in Linnaeus's Systema naturae, particularly one of a man arrived at maturity, who was caught in a forest of Hanover, & afterwards brought over to England. He appeared to know nothing of other men, when brought into their company, and to have no other reason than a changeling or idiot. This may be used as an argument by some, that man is naturally void of reason, but it must be remembered that the person here mentioned, was as it were out of his element, in being out of society, and had not an opportunity of exerting it. Besides it cannot be determined, whether or not he ~~had had the~~ would have been an Best

though he had hae the advantages of education.

The number of Hermits and Anchorites who have been in different places of the world particularly in Arabia & Palestine, may be alledged by some, to prove that man is by nature an insociable animal. But this is not the case, for these Hermits & Anchorets think that they will please God by denying themselves the joys of society. For they do it not because it is consistent with, but because it is contrary to nature.

There are likewise other men of a gloomy and retired turn, but on this account we are not to judge mankind in general insociable. For we may as well conclude, that because some raon are blind and deaf either by a natural defect, or some

accident, therefore all men are not endued with the senses of seeing and hearing.

Man has likewise a superiority over other animals, by estimation and power. The first has a reference to his discernment, & by it we judge of perfect & imperfect, ~~and by it we prefer and reject,~~ ~~for tho' the object which we prefer has sometimes less merit than that which we reject, the act is still the same~~. By his power he renders the other animals subservient to his use. By his invention he decoys the timorous, and overcomes the strong. There is a certain scale in nature at the head of which we place ourselves, viz. from bodies which are not organized to such as are, from organized bodies to animal life & from hence to intellectual mind.

Thus have I ~~laid~~ before you the qualities

by which man, resembles or is distinguished from other ani-
mals, but the account will be imperfect, except I likewise
show by what men are themselves diversified,
whether in ~~whether they be~~ different races ~~of race~~, different
ages of the same race, or individuals of the
same race & age. But before I proceed to this
I shall first point out by what qualities, one
& the same person may be distinguished at dif-
ferent Periods of his life. These Periods may
be divided in four or five, viz. Infancy, Child-
hood, Adolescence, Manhood, and Old age.
In the first of these man is very helpless ani-
mal, more so than even the Brutes themselves.
He seems not to have the use of the organs
of sense, his eyes are fixed on no particular
object, nor his ears capable of recieving any sound.
He is totally void of that information, which
he is afterwards to possess in the subsequent

Periods of Life. This he begins to acquire at the approach of the second Period; he casts his eyes about him & learns to distinguish the objects which are as yet entirely new to him. He now is sensible of his feeble condition, & takes measures accordingly. Towards the end of Childhood reason begins to dawn upon him, he now is able to know the difference betwixt good and evil. When arrived at the period of adolescence, he looks forward to those which follow, and lays the plan of his future conduct. At this time he acquires the Habits, which he is to carry through Life, & on the goodness or badness of these depends his Happiness or misery. It is sometimes the misfortune of young men, that those who are about them instill into them a taste for pleasure and dress, but this is only laying the foundation

of future Distress. There is an inclination in most young men to ridicule what defects & failings are imposed on some by nature, which is apt to banish all the tender feelings of humanity and compassion. This thing gives rise to petulance, than which nothing is more opposite to candour or benevolence. Candour is an act of the mind, which in judging of any thing, makes every just allowance, and does as it would be done to.

Lecture 8th

In Manhood we practise those Habits which we have got in our youth, and as I observed before are happy or miserable, according to those. It is likewise worth observation, that the character of a man in the period of maturity depends more upon the manner of

passing his time in his Adolescence, than any after reflection. Old age again refers to facts in past life, and minds what was formerly, rather than that which is at present. It is likewise anxious with regard to the future, and hence ariseth avarice, which is often the vice of this Period of Life. Old men are apt to be severe, as they are sensible of the many dangers, into which the young are sometimes led by inexperience. Notwithstanding this austerity it is of great advantage to young men to be in the company, & under the authority of men in advanced Life.

I come now to consider the varieties by which different races are distinguished All animals are naturally inclined to propagate their species, and the young of each

species bears a resemblance to the parent.

Two animals of different species may produce an animal partaking of the nature of both but this mixture, as for example the mule, never can breed.

X There are other animals of different races but of the same species, which can propagate, & whose offspring can likewise propagate, as the Horse & Dog.

There are likewise different races of men who differ in their features, stature, complection, dispositions, and customs. These varieties may be attributed to the climates in which they are situated, or to their different manners of life. Every animal is observed to thrive best in the range intended by nature, e.g. the Horse, who carried to every quarter of the world is in greatest perfection in Barbary and

Arabia. This is likewise the case with the Human Species, for tho' it is restricted to no particular climate, the inhabitants of the temperate zones are greatly superior, as well in their intellectual as in their animal nature. It is true, indeed that Mechanicks have arrived at greater perfection in the hot countries, but the states of Europe, are founded on much firmer principles in politicks. I do not pretend to assign the cause of this, but only mention the fact, discovered by observation.

Lecture 9th

The races of men, like those of other animals of the same species mix together, and adopt one anothers customs. The Gauls and Germans invaded the Aborigines or ancient Britons, and settling in their country, introduced their own manners, ~~into the country~~.

All the independent states of which Italy was made up, were joined together, and formed a powerful one; and this again was overthrown by the Scythians, a barbarous people, who came from the East, & brought their customs into the countries of Europe.

It is not the Progress, which individuals make in any kind of knowledge, which constitutes the difference of the same race in different ages, but it is the improvement of the race in general. Nations in their barbarous state are without any of those arts which tend to render life pleasant and convenient. Some have neither flocks, nor property in land, but joint tenants with the Beasts of the fields, feed on the fruits & live in the caves furnished

by nature. Others have flocks, but no fixt property. These have a great advantage over the former, both as they have some object to which they may turn their attention, and as they can afford themselves better food.

A third kind more civilized than any of the other two, has fields of their own to ~~flocks~~ feed their flocks, and produce, by cultivation, vegetables necessary to their subsistence.

The arts practised among ~~polished~~ nations are commercial, literary, & political.

When a nation has more of certain kinds of commodities, and lys of others than it has occasion for, the commercial arts take place. It barters or sells to another nation, the things which are superfluous, for others of which it stands in need. The commercial

arts, are exercised, among those nations, which begin to be polished, prior to the introduction of the literary and political.

~~When individuals in a nation have not the mere conveniences of their animal life in view, they cultivate the Literary arts.~~

The commercial arts respect the mere preservation and accommodation of Life, whereas the literary tend to improve the mind. They have for their object the exercise of the understanding, the imagination and heart. The Political arts regard totally neither Body nor Mind, but are of a mixed nature between the other two. By them rules are laid down to settle forms of government, and support them when established, to direct individuals in

the discharge of publick offices, to command armies and fleets. We are not to expect that these arts give rise to all the virtues; on the contrary, they sometimes are the means of introducing vice into society.

Lecture 10th

Some people entertain a mistaken notion, that the study of these arts ~~excite in~~ is connected with ~~this mind~~, sentiments of honour, candour fidelity, courage, and the other virtues, but these sentiments are the gifts of God to every individual, whether the society of which he is a member, be rude or civilized. Study alone has no real advantage in it; the end which we pursue by means of it constitutes its use, and the end which we should have in view, ought to be the good of mankind.

~~It would be an endless task to mention~~

~~every period of the same race, but different ages. But that is necessary, is to point out some of the most extraordinary, referring to some remarkable change in the same race.~~

Ages ~~then~~ are said to be savage, barbarous, and polished. This distinction I chuse rather to follow than that of Montesquieu, who is apt to confuse the particular periods into which he divides the ages. He calls those hunters and fishers, who likewise practise agriculture, and vice versa.

The expressions savage and barbarous, I am afraid, may be mistaken for cruel and inhuman. But I mean by these words savage and barbarous, the nations which are without the commercial, literary, or

trace all the changes, and minute gradations in the History of the Species.

I shall therefore show some of the most striking points of view, by which we may fill up the intermediate steps.

political arts. By polished nations, I mean not, that they have any other advantage over the two already mentioned, except in being possessed of these three kinds of arts.

Lecture 11th

In the savage state there is no subordination, nor regular form of government. For as there is no property, all are on an equal footing. The old men sit in council whilst the young go out to war. If a person be put to death, the murderer is not immediately punished, but the friends of the deceased, and sometimes the whole community of which he was a member, are never satisfied till they have avenged his death. Even the nation of which the murderer is one will not recieve him, as

this thing might prove fatal to it, by occasioning a breach between it & the other nation. The resentment with which they persecute offenders, has often a better effect in restraining crimes than the wise laws, which are established among civilized nations.

Although they have not a regular body of Laws, their sentiments of justice and honor ty keep them in due subjection. They sometimes use intoxicating Drugs such as Opium and Tobacco, which inflame their spirits, and renour them outrageous so long as they continue to poseess their heads. They are likewise immoderately fond of spirituous liquors, which they either make among them selves, or get from others in exchange for other commodities. As there is no property among

them, there are few competitions; but when any happen, they are owing to excess in drinking. They are however in a continual state of warfare with the neighbouring nations, which thing the delight which man takes in dangers and difficulties may account for. Their harangues are figurative, and have a good deal of mimickry in them; the expressions are strong, and the action graceful. They have interludes between the sittings of their councils, in which they either celebrate their own praises, or censure the actions of others. A similar custom to this gave rise to the tragedy & comedy among the Greeks and Romans. It is a proof that the savage state has always been the same, that writers of all ages mention like circumstances

relating to it. In this state too men are observed to have no small price, insomuch that I have heard of an army of Indians clothed in raggs, & covered with dirt marching thro' an army of Europeans without deigning to look at them, so high a notion had they of their own superiority.

Although for convenience sake, I have described those men who live in the savage state as not improving, yet they are making daily progress towards the polished. The tree under which an Indian lies, he covers with furrs & leaves to shelter him better from the inclemencies of the weather. The branch he cut from the tree he sharpens into an arrow, or bends into a bow. Forseeing how difficult it would

be in some seasons to overtake their game, they catch them when young, and tame them, the Greenlanders in particular their rain-deer, which they not only eat, but apply to the Draught, and other uses.

In the barbarous state men are possessed of property, but have not an established form of government, nor are acquainted with the commercial, literary, or political arts. Their competitions encrease, in proportion to their property, and in the unequal distribution of this consists their rank and distinction.

Lecture 12th

I have continued longer on the History of the species, than I shall on any other part

of our course, and as it is a subject of great importance; I shall show some farther particulars relating to it.

I have represented the rude nations in a much more favorable light, than they are commonly imagined. For I am of opinion that it is not external accomplishments, which constitute a man, but it is the dispositions of the mind. It is not Beauty, Equipage, Dress, and the like, but Courage, Patience, Justice, and the other vertues, which are the characteristicks of a man. These vertues are found among incivilized nations, who have been thought to be altogether void of them.

Among the rude nations flocks and

herds are their first property. The ground on which they feed is at first in common to them all, but as it begins to be valued, they desire the exclusive property of it. In the unequal distribution of this, consists the rank & distinction which takes place among them. There are others who live in tents, and change their situations when pasture and water fail them, such as the ancient Scythians and the present Arabs, and Tartars. This restless disposition is owing in a good measure to the lying of the country; for all that extent of land which is between the Euxine sea, & Japan is a vast plain, so level that a wheel carriage may easily go up

and down without any beaten road. It is likewise interspersed with large rivers which run however so slow, that they may be passed without any difficulty. But in Europe, where there were formerly forests, and marshes, & where the country is mountainous, they soon fixed their habitations. Among those nations whose property consists in flocks and herds the masters as well as the servants tend their cattle, as we read of the Patriarch Abraham.

When they first begin to cultivate the ground they take but one years crop of the same field; but afterwards finding that by proper management, the same piece of land improves, it is an inducement to them to settle.

Through a desire of property, barbarous

nations make often attempts to acquire the lands which they see well cultivated; thus the Gauls often endeavoured to possess themselves of Italy, & once actually plundered the city Rome. The Goths and Vandals afterwards in the 5th century overran all Europe, which they looked upon as more valuable than their northern regions. The Tartars likewise made themselves masters of China, India, and other fruitful countries in the East.

Lecture 13th.

I have observed that the first property of rude nations is their flocks and herds, that next they take one crop of the land on which they happen to be, that afterwards they settle on the parts on which they wander, most

frequently on those which are well cultivated,
I now proceed to speak of their form of government
whether in a state of migration or settlement.
This last state is distinguished from the for
mer by unequal possession of property, which
as I said before makes the difference between
Superior and Inferior. The condition in which
the superior is placed furnishes him with
frequent opportunities of shewing his cou-
rage, liberality, and Generosity. His number
of followers and retainers put it often in his
power to exert his authority in defending and
protecting them. Their duties again to their
Leader are Gratitude and Fidelity. His exalted
Station renders it necessary for him to be poss
essed of great courage, as he is bound in

honour to be the first in every enterprise.
It is likewise accounted base & shameful for
the followers to survive their leaders, as Tacitus
tells us de moribus Germanorum; cum ventum
in aciem, turpe principi, virtute vinci, turpe
comitatui virtutem principis non adaquare.
Iam vero infame in omnem vitam ac probro-
sum, superstitem principi suo ex acie recessi-
se. And Cæsar says that there never was an
instance among them in the memory of man of a follower
surviving his leader who had fallen in battle.
This is a similar custom to that which
prevails in India of the favourite wife throw-
ing herself into the funeral Pile of her deceas-
ed Husband. This is a point of honour a-

mong them, which it is thought ignominious to decline.

In this age the words royal and noble begin to be used. Yet these titles in that age were taken in a very different sense from what they are now. Tho' riches render the possessors more illustrious and powerful, we are not to expect them in every canton, yet their government may appear to be monarchical. This kind is thought by some to be the first, & most natural, and Kings to be the Vicegerents of God. We ought however to guard against the wrong interpration of words, for their monarchy was very different from what some persons have represented it. Their Kings never took

measures relating to the publick without calling a council; de minoribus rebus principes consultant, de majoribus omnes, says Tacitus. And Homer tells us that when Agamemnon wanted to deliberate concerning any thing he called the princes, and if it was of great importance, the whole people. Telemachus too when travelling through the states, did nothing without the δημος αχαιων being assembled. As their prerogative was restricted, (power granted) it could not be limited. But these expressions are peculiar to ages, in which literature flourishes, and in which there is an established form of government. Their kings are almost on an equal footing with their subjects, inter eadem pecora, et in eadem humo degunt, as Tacitus says.

Telemachus, who in his fathers absence, was placed in the highest station, went to the council not alone for two Dogs attended him. The keeper of the swine likewise was one of his ablest counsellors, which circumstance shows what a small degree of rank was between the King and him. The only distinction which Homer mentions is magnanimity, Cæsar and Tacitus show the same thing. The Prince could do nothing of himself, without the assent of his senate, which consists of those who are near his person. It is not to be supposed that those, who live almost on an equal footing with their King, & have it in their power to carry their intentions into execution, will pay passive obedience to their King. This species of govern-

ment then, which some look upon as Monarchical, is really Democratical. It is at least of a mixed kind, as not only the nobles, but likewise the whole people sometimes are present at the councils.

Thus have I shewed some particulars relating to the Government of rude nations after the establishment of property, I am now about to mention some of their manners in this state. They are just and amicable in their intercourse with one another. This we find illustrated by Homer. Damascenus de moribus gentium, and Justin. They are hospitable to the solitary stranger, whom they entertain with corn; but are full of animosi

ty towards foreign nations.

Lecture 14th

There are likewise two curious things regarding this state which are worth our notice. The one is their manner of carrying on war, to which in the barbarous state, they are allured by the hopes of acquiring property. Any individual without consulting the rest may bring about a war, and draw to him a vast croud of attendants. They sometimes make war against a neighbouring state merely to exercise their courage. Tacitus de moribus German. Chap. 14. The virtues which ~~the~~ they possess ~~admiring~~ ~~them~~ are of the military kind, which among them constitute honour.

In their publick assemblies they dis-

play their wisdom and Eloquence. Among rude nations all the literature which they have is vested in their Priests. We must call their efforts of genius traditionary, rather than committed to writing; tho' most nations have this art, altho' they have not science.

Homer's Poems are excellent specimens of the simple manners of the people among whom he lived, which neither Virgil nor Tasso could equal, as the times in which they wrote were widely different from Homer's.

The sword was thought to be the only restraint of injury, from which arose the Judicial combat. The magistrate did nothing but fix the cases and manner of combat; hence they

went armed even in times of peace. This custom was abolished when they began to be more polished, the wearing a sword however still remained, which was looked upon as the mark of a gentleman. Dueling ~~however~~ which sprung from the judicial combat, has never been allogether destroyed. When the Honour of a single person was concerned they acted under little restraint, Tacit. Thus revenge not only arose from these manners, but it was likewise reckoned a point of honour. Such are the manners of hordes which act seperately. But when they assemble together, with a view to some common end, it is impossible to tell what numbers will

unite; They are however apt to break and to follow ~~superior~~ seperate leaders, if they are not kept in constant employment. Gingis kan and Tamerlanes armies were made up of Hundreds of Thousands, yet in the intervals they began to drop off. In the same manner the army of the Greeks under Agamemnon and that of the Goths and Vandals under Alaric. It is impossible to say what multitudes will assemble, when they have any conquest to make or any evil to repell.

It is probable that the assembling of so many, may lay the foundation of a despotick government. For it certainly must change

both their government and manners. It must inspire the leader with higher ideas of his own superiority, and likewise render the followers more submissive. If these vast multitudes fail in their enterprises they go to ruin; thus we read of 300000 Helvetii, who made an unsuccessful attempt on Italy, wholly extirpated. But if they conquer their enemies, they either settle in their new acquired possessions, as the Goths and Vandals, or return enriched with spoil to their former abodes, as the Tartars. These conquests give rise to military government.

The feudal System likewise was introduced into Europe by the Gothes & Vandals. It was first grants of land from the chief to his followers. These grants were originally temporary, but afterwards in the west of Europe became hereditary.

Lecture 15th

We are now come to the third general head which I proposed in the division of our species in different ages, I mean the polished. By the Etymology of the word, it would appear to respect the political arts only, but it likewise comprehends the commercial and literary. In this state the ingenuity of particu-

lar persons recieves all possible improvement. But they are not prompted by situation to acquire application and variety of Habits. The arts make considerable progress but it is very slow, for mankind is extremely averse to sudden changes. We are apt to imagine that the arts will take place much sooner than they really do, and are so amazed that rude nations should be so unwilling to recieve them when they are so useful in life. It is impossible to know how long nations may continue uncivilized without making much progress. But it is observed that in 700, 800, or 1000 years a nation is at its highest pitch of perfection in polity, and from that period begins to de-

cline. Although no one can determine what is absolutely necessary, yet we may attribute the progress of the arts to three things, viz. Necessity, Use, and Pleasure. It is very improper to follow different pursuits, & this takes place not only with regard to those, which respect the body, but likewise the mind. The members of a community than ought to apply themselves to seperate and different pursuits, to arrive at any degree of perfection in them. The following of different pursuits gives rise to commerce. For those things which one has no use for, he exchanges for others which will be of greater service to him. There is

another advantage arising from this, that Industry becomes habitual, to which Interest is a spur. Ingenuity however is sometimes checked by the exercise of the arts. In over seeing a work ingenuity is necessary, but in executing the work itself, little is required.

By the improvement of the arts mildness, peace and attention to interest, are produced, but in consequence of the last jealousy & other crimes are apt to arise.

The rise of the literary arts is to be attributed to the enquiries of the curious. But they often pay more attention to the past than to the present, and to what is fictitious, than that which is real. It is not merely being

a mechanic or speculator, which constitutes a man fit for defence or government. The warrior & politician are employed in very different pursuits. The different ranks of men in a nation are jealous of their respective interests, and sensible of their rights, fail not to claim them. They are likewise subject to internal corruption, although they live in external peace. + In following its pursuits the mind is apt to be little, which renders it incapable of any thing great or noble. Industry is of the greatest advantage to society, but by introducing the sentiments of

interest, it sometimes occasions selfishness and breaks friendship and affection. Attention to interest likewise is apt to form a false standard of Excellence. For we are ready to imagine that whatever suits our purpose best, is what we ought to pursue.

Lecture 16th

With regard to war barbarous nations are greatly inferior to those which are more polished. For regular discipline is more than a match for the superior strength of uncivilized nations. But when they begin to decline, and when they are not in a capacity to join the forces of their state, they return to their former barbarous

condition. It may be thought that I should have added the corrupted state to those of Savage, Barbarous, and Polished. But as great corruption may take place where the arts are at a very low ebb, I shall not adjoin this state. Besides we cannot determine what is corrupted untill we consider what is excellent in man. Therefore I shall leave this, till I come to that part of our course, where I treat of the principles of morality. I have dwelt longer on this part, as I forsee the advantages, which arise from it, viz. in taking off the prejudices, relating to human nature, which we are apt contract.

I now proceed to shew some qualities by which individuals of the same race are,

distinguished, namely respect, capacity, disposition, and force. There are varieties in the features and carriage of all men, which distinguish them from one another. tho' this were not the case, the different sentiments of the mind expressed in the countenance would be sufficient distinctions. There are still more important varieties, those of the mind. The first of these is capacity, which enables the mind to observe and apply the Powers of nature. By it we penetrate and invent, & then apply our inventions. Quickness and Promptitude of Parts are marks of capacity, & which are necessary to carry our inventions into execution. The next thing in which we differ from one another, is in our dispos-

tions. When we talk of diligence or remissness, with regard to the good of our fellow creatures, we refer to our dispositions to Activity and Indolence; These constitute great & important differences in man, For the exertions of the mind are the only proofs of its existence, when these do not appear, it ceases to be. Some minds can bear very small exertions and are tired out with a little application, others again can be employed for a considerable time in thinking without being fatigued. Individuals likewise differ greatly in the warmth or coldness of their Tempers. Some men use all their endeavours to promote the good of

mankind in general, while others of a more phlegmatic & indifferent temper attend to their own private interest alone.

A man may be possessed of ingenuity, quickness, and good dispositions, but except he have force of mind to carry these into execution, they go for nothing. They are like a fine edge, every little enjoyment or disappointment is sufficient to destroy their effect. The only manner in which we can account for these varieties is, that the same powerful hand that distinguished our species from every other, has likewise been pleased out of his infinite wisdom to distinguish individuals among

themselves. All that we can do, is to observe the fact that the faculties of the minds of men differ widely from one another. These as well as the features and the external qualities devolve from the parent upon the off spring, but there are so many exceptions, that it cannot be established as a general remark. Some persons have imagined that the faculties of the mind depend on the nice structure of the animal frame, but there is an insuperable objection to this, that body and mind are two distinct & seperate things. We see that the habit of the body has a considerable influence on the mind, but how that comes to pass,

we cannot determine. We are sensible that diseases, and divers kinds of liquors and Drugs affect the mind, but how? is not a matter to be decided. The proper inference from this is that we ought to take care of our health so far as it influences our mind, and be temperate in the use of those things which affect our understanding. We become culpable however, if Anxiety about health occupy so much of our attention, as to make us neglect the duties of the mind. The exertions of the Powers depend on the dispositions of the mind. The warm, the bold and the friendly, whose motive is the good of mankind, act with superior advantage to the cold & selfinterested. We

ought then to improve those disposition-
ons, which render our enterprises success
ful. These are the only inferences which
we can draw with regard to the influence
of the mind on the body. The Varieties
in the capacities, dispositions, & force
of mind in men, are of the greatest impor
tance, as they fit individuals for different
pursuits in life, like the several Parts
of an organized body.

Lecture 17th

I now proceed to that important questi-
on, relating to the nature of man. That
which renders this thing more difficult is
the manner in which we enquire into
it, and the different views in which man

appears. We can immediately determine with regard to the nature of other animals Amphibious animals we see live both in land and water, the fowls in the air, and so on. The difficulty arising from the manner in which we enquire into the subject arises from our arrangement of it, which is mere by arbitrary, ~~and which we take at pleasure.~~ There are two sets of Duties, which we may divide into Original and Adventitious. The first kind alludes to the state of nature, the other to the state of society. Some writers have represented man in his natural state to be a shy animal, averse to society; but of this we have not the least account in History. Let us now

examine the different parts of the question first, what is the earliest state of mans nature, secondly what is the happiest state, or which of mans different situations is most fitted to his nature. Those who have treated of this subject, have not considered the divisions seperately, but have confounded them together. The first is a question of fact. We ought not to use conjecture to explain those periods to which history does not reach, we should apply one of the rules which we layed down at the beginning of our course, viz that the qualities of those Bodies, whose vertues cannot be encreased or diminished, on which we make experiments, are to be esteemed universal

qualities of bodies. We are then to judge of what man was formerly, by what he is at present. The varieties which appear in the nature of man ~~naturally~~ lead us to enquire into more minute circumstances relating to his original situation. In this he seems to have been void of all the conveniences of life, which he afterwards acquires by his reason and natural ingenuity. But little advantage can be reaped from this part of the question, the next is more important, what is the happiest state? but as it is necessary first to know what constitutes the happiness of man, we cannot as yet be proper judges of this. Before we have considered the matter fully, our own opinions will be apt to mislead us.

Lecture 18th.

The natural state of man is a state of society, which hath been universally found to be the case. The question relating to the earliest state of nature is merely historical. We cannot proceed in the enquiry any farther than our own remarks, or those of others reach. In this state we are not to suppose man destitute of reason, nor unable to know the difference between moral good and evil. He has the use of language, and some other Talents by nature; but he has still a great many adventitious faculties. As to the question, which is the Happiest state of man, some are of one opinion, others of another. We are apt to

affix the idea of happiness, to a certain con
dition, at which when we arrive, we are as
far from contentment as we were before. But
this we may be assured of, that happiness
is not to be found in any external situati
on, but depends entirely on the state of
the mind. It is this which enjoys and suffers
and not the external situation. We sometimes
indeed speak of a happy situation, but this
is in a metaphorical sense of the word.
Tho' man may be happy in a great many
different situations, the question still re-
curs in which is he happiest? The necess
saries of Life, and other wants afford ex
ercise to his animal powers, and intellec-

faculties, and connect him with the objects which are around him. As he is not confined to any particular range, like the other animals, his external situations must be far more various, and consequently his happiness limited to no particular one. Every person connects ~~the~~ certain circumstances of the station in which he is placed, with the idea of happiness. If you ask the Arabick on the shores of the Caspian sea, he will describe to you the wheel carriage, in which he removes his family from one place to another, his darts, spears, &c. The inhabitant of the populous city, will describe stately Buildings, gilded carriages, and costly ap

parel. It is a matter of indifference to the child new born, whether he be placed in the train of a Tartar, or in the palace ~~face~~ of a King. Every situation is alike to whole races, as well as to the individual before they are fixed ~~by~~ to some particular one, by habit. It cannot however be denied that the mind can exert itself better in some situations, than in others.

But the relation of external circumstances is rather from man to man, than from the happiness of a man to any external situation; as the relation of a master to a slave. Some masters are insolent and domineering and some slaves ~~who~~ are timorous and servile, but there are other master who are neither

insolent nor domineering, and other slaves who are neither timorous, nor servile.

The natural state of man, is that in which all his faculties can be fully exerted; and this may be equally applied to all other animals. We are apt to make use of words the sense of which we either mistake, or are not at all acquainted with. Thus the word nature is often misapplied. It is thought by some to respect only the powers of the mind in the original state of man but this is not its true sense ~~of it~~, for it also respects the powers which our species acquires thro' a long succession of ages. By dividing our powers into natural and

artificial, they have confused the subject, but had they made the distinctions of original, & adventitious, they would have avoided this inconvenience. For that which we stile artificial is as much a part of mans nature as the other. Mr Rousseau hath fallen into this mistake, against the influence of which we ought to guard.

Lecture 19th

In our enquiries into nature, as gravitation, vegetation, and animal Life we infer the causes from the effects. But in treating of our own nature, we enjoy great advantages, we are not only the Spectators but likewise the Actors, we are not only

the subject of enquiry, but we ourselves enquire. But as the mind is naturally inclined to attend to external objects, great part of our life is sometimes past, before we look within ourselves. If however we should chuse to make any progress in science, we must leave off this habit, & make ourselves acquainted with the operations of our minds. This knowledge will be of the greatest importance to us, of infinitely more than any knowledge relating to external objects. By it are we fitted to manage our own hearts, by it are we made arbiters of our pleasures and pains.

In treating then of the History of

the Individual, I shall first mention some facts drawn from the subject, without regard ing, any former System. This will be of great consequence to us, as these general facts become principles, and ~~tend~~ serve to explain many particulars, in the conduct of man. It will be more necessary, to pay no regard to former Theories and Systems, as several Hypotheses have been produced, and pretty generally recieved, which have not been raised upon facts drawn from human nature, but from mere analogy. We ought to observe this as a rule, to steem every fact ultimate, untill we find one more general, under which we may comprehend

it. The division of Science, which we made at the beginning of the course, we should here remember, as there are facts in each of them, which cannot be explained on the principles of any of the others. It may be said that like plants the ~~human~~ body draws in the nourishment, and assimilates it to its own nature, but still there are a great many other things relating to animal life which neither Mechanism, Vegetation, nor Intelligence can account for. Animal heat for instance cannot be explained either on mechanical, or Chymical principles. In the same manner we account for reason knowledge &c by intelligence alone. Some writers however have been so absurd in their

speculations, as to extend mechanical facts to intellectual Phanomena. Thus Mr Hobbes, Des Cartes, and Mr Locke introduced false doctrines, of this kind. It is impossible to give a definition of consciousness; It is expressed by the particle I, which is placed in contradistinction to every other object. By consciousness we connect the past, present and future, and think ourselves accountable for the actions we have already committed, and which we are to commit. With regard to the animal functions, the beauty, and wisdom with which they are disposed is remarkable The circulation of the blood is not left to the vigilance of the animal, as the least

suspension might prove fatal to him.
But respiration is under his own direction,
as he may suspend it for some time, without
the least danger. Some persons have be-
lieved, that there is another soul within us
from which our animal fuctions proceed
which the Latins called anima. From this,
say they, come many actions, which we
are not conscious of, as the motion of the
eyelid, and the like. But we are at first
sensible of these, which afterwards becom-
ing habits, are not percieved by us.

Lecture 20th

The principle vital functions then
depend upon the mind, tho' they be not

intended. The intellectual functions, as thought judgement, design &c, have not a reference to corporeal organs. There is nothing similar or analogous to them either in Mechanicks, or in the structure of the animal frame. We speak indeed of thoughts being the employment of the head, and sentiment of the heart, but this is metaphorically. That which has probably given rise to this is, that the head, in which are placed the organs of sense is as it were an observatory, from which we view external objects. The heart is said to the seat of affection, desire, and the other sentiments; ~~hence it is said~~ and to be

cold, warm &c; For grief, joy, fear and the like have an affect upon ~~the~~ its motions ~~of the heart~~. From this it comes that in almost every language the heart signifies all our sentiments. But as they have nothing analogous to the body, there is no reason why we should not suppose them to exist, after the mind is seperated from the body. In the mixed functions the mind as an intelligent being perceives ~~the difference between good & evil~~. But in these its perceptions there is always a reference to the intervention of some bodily organ. ~~In this we refer to sensation, wherefore~~ We may divide these functions into sensation and appetite. In treating of sensa-

tion, I shall first mention some particulars relating to the organ, and then others relating to what is intellectual in the sensation. It hath been found by repeated trials in anatomy that the Brain and branches of nerves which proceed from it are the first parts of the fœtus which are formed in the womb of the parent. To these afterwards accrease the other parts, which compleat the structure of the body. These nerves convey sensation to the Brain, and when the continuation is broke off the part seperated becomes paralytical. With regard to sensation, I shall first speak of touch, and not observe the order of the

ingenious Dr Reid in his enquiry into the human mind, who begins with the sense of smelling. It will be more proper to make touch the first subject of our examination as most of the others relate to this. The number of nerves which are distributed throughout the whole surface of the body, produce the sense of touch. The hands in a particular manner are furnished with it as they have most occasion for it. Touch is divided into two parts, viz internal and external. Of the internal we are never sensible, except on the approach, or in the time of some disease, when we feel pain. In external touch, we sometimes are only sensi-

ble of the presence of the objects; but in other cases, we likewise know their qualities as heat, cold, &c. When we only percieve the existence of objects, they are said to have secondary qualities, but when their causes are likewise evident, they are said to have primary qualities. In touching external objects, we feel their roughness, smoothness, hardness, softness, & the like, but the sensation is neither the bodies which we feel, nor the mind by which we feel them. It is a general law in nature, that we are led from the knowledge of some things, to the knowledge of others. There is in many cases a natural and firm connection between

the signs, and things signified, which are fixed by almighty God, & which are not arbitrary.

Lecture 21st

In our last we considered the sense of touch, we now proceed to consider that of hearing. The organ is the termination of a nerve, which can be traced to the brain. The sound is produced by the agitation & concentration of the air in the external ear, and its force is encreased by rushing thro' the windings. Within there is a membrane which is called the Tympanum, or drum of the ear. There is no analogy between touch and the sense of hearing. By

sound we know the existence of the quali-
ty, but its nature is left as the subject
of our enquiry. It is the vibration of
those parts which sound, that produce it.
And the quantity emitted is proportionable
to the elasticity of the body. The explosi-
on and concussion of the air is likewise
the cause of sound; and its intensenesſ
depends on the shock which the air re-
cieves. According to the computation made
by Sir Isaac Newton the velocity of all
sounds is equal, about 400 Yards in a
second, which is the 4th or 5th Part of a
mile. The sounds emitted by different

bodies are easily distinguished. Tho' two musical instruments be brought to the same tone by the hand of the ablest Musician the difference is at first observed. This difference we may suppose was intended by nature, that we might distinguish the external objects which produced them.

Tho' sound only shews us the existence and not the nature of qualities, we come by experience to connect with sounds the respective Bodies from which they are emitted. Thus we know the sound of a cannon from that of a bell. The rustling of leaves, the whispering of the winds, the noise occasioned by the collision

of two hard Bodies ~~to~~ are easily distinguished. Thus by experience we learn, if I may be allowed the expression, the language of every object.

The sensation of smell is very different from that of hearing, in several respects. As agreeable or disagreeable it is often considered apart from its cause, however it always acquaints us with the presence of external objects. Above the nostril there is a cavity, in which is placed the olfactory nerve. This nerve conveys the odour to the brain, and produces the sensation. The pleasantness or fetidness of bodies is proportioned to their volatility, and to

the quantity of evaporated particles, which operate upon the olfactory nerve. We can not discover the cause of this sense, we ~~are~~ only know its existence, so that it is a secondary quality. We may however easily discern the wisdom of providence, in placing this organ near the mouth, as by it we recieve or reject the food offered us. Sound is similar to smell in this respect, that by experience both enable us to distinguish those bodies which are near us. Most of the other animals possess the sense of smell in an exquisite degree. By it they are led to procure the means of subsistence, and avoid the approach of danger.

With regard to the sensation of Taste, there is an intimate connection between this and Smell. Their qualities are for the most part similar, for where the one is disagreeable the other is commonly so too. The strength of taste is often weakened by smell, which circumstance is a proof of the relation they bear one to another. It may be said that I should have mentioned taste, when I was speaking of touch, but it is a distinct and seperate sense. There are many things too minute to be felt by the hand, which are easily discerned by the palate. Tastes are likewise secondary qualities, we do not see the causes from whence

they proceed.

Lecture 22

I observed before that it was a general law of our nature to be led from the knowledge of one thing to the knowledge of another, like the links in a chain; and this is called Investigation; the discovery of these links is called Interpretation; and the feelings which our minds have by the intervention of bodily organs, Perception. Some perceptions are original, necessary, and unavoidable, as hardness, others are acquired. I have likewise observed, that by experience we connect Sound, Smell, and Taste, with the particular bodies which emit them, and that they are secondary qualities.

Let us now go on to the sense of seeing. Its qualities are so numerous and complicated, that it is difficult to distinguish the original perceptions, which are to be referred to it. The organ consists of a ball which moves in a bony socket. This ball has three Tunica or coats, which are called the sclerotis cornea and chorioides; and as many humours, called the aqueous, crystalline, and vitreous. Within these is the retina, which is so called from its being the optic nerve expanded like a net. On this are the pictures of every object on which we look, inverted; and according as these pictures are distinct, the objects appear distinct to us. The first and simplest sensation is light and darkness. There are

some who can only distinguish between light or brilliant colours and darkness. If thus we did only percieve the presence or absence of light, seeing would be similar to the other senses, that is would only intimate secondary qualities. But it likewise shews us the figure, motion, and distance of bodies. The particles of light must be extremely minute as they affect our bodies, and even our eyes, with no pain, altho' their velocity is so great that by geometrical demonstration, they are found to move upwards of 80,000,000 of miles in about seven minutes. The rays of light are propagated in right lines, but may be driven out of their direction by

the different media thro' which they pass. This is called Refraction, when they are turned aside by passing from a denser medium to a rarer, and vice versa. When we have any defect in our sight it is owing to too much or too little refraction, which is occasioned by a wrong consistence of the humours. We know not the connection between the picture upon the retina of the eye, & the perception produced; it is an undisputed fact, and must be accounted a law of our constitution. It remains to distinguish the original and acquired perceptions by means of sight. Many doubts have arisen with regard to this. As the organ of sight

and consequently the image on the retina is double, and as this image is likewise inverted, some men have supposed that originally every object is double & inverted. But this conclusion rests on a very slight foundation. We are here supposed to understand the connection between the impression, and the perception; but we can as easily conceive that nature should make us see a single object from two Images, as from one. Objects only are seen single, when in certain given relative positions to the eyes, and to one another. When the eyes move not in a parellel direction, the objects on which we look, appear double.

Lecture 23

By means of the eye, we can perceive extension, but not in all dimensions. In certain positions a circle appears to be oval, and sometimes one straight line. In the other senses there is but one step from the sensation to the perception, but in this sense there is another step, viz a visible species or spectre. We ought first to trace the visible species from the quality which we are led to perceive by means of that species. It is extended, and limited by out lines. Sight does not distinguish distance, consequently the visible species of every object must be a plain surface, which may have a variety

of light and shade. The figure is compounded of the actual figure of the body, considered as a solid, and its position relatively to the eye. The magnitude of a body is measured by the angle under which it appears, consequently the magnitude of the visible species of the same body at different distances must vary. Independant of the other senses, it is probable that all bodies would be referred to the same distance. Thus to those who are unacquainted with Philosophy the Heavenly Bodies, and Meteors, which are out of the reach of the other senses, appear equally distant. We come to learn the actual magnitude, and other primary

qualities of bodies, by interpreting this visible species, which we do by means of an other sense. In measuring other Bodies we always refer to our own as a standard thus all great measures are multiples of the smaller, by which we measure our Bodies. By means of touch then we come to interpreta the visible species We judge of distances by the apparent magnitude of bodies, we likewise judge of their real magnitude by their apparent. To see bodies at different distances ye Crystalline humour must change its position. It is probable that it gives a fine sensation, which becoming habitual we are apt to over-

look, but which renders us sensible in some measure of different distances. The diversity of the visible species, arising from the infinite number of different distances, is so great, that the same is hardly ever repeated. We are however so well adapted to our nature, that though the visible species be continually varying, we can perceive objects to be the same. For this we are not indebted to human wisdom but to the hand of nature. This is evident from Changelings and Poets, and even the Beasts themselves being possessed of this perception. The talent of combining the perceptions which arise from different or all the senses ~~it~~ is an acquired Habit. Sight is the

first sense which is used by infants; they afterwards learn that what they see may be touched, heard, and smelt.

Lecture 24th

As our sensations are the foundation of all our knowledge of external things, so appetite is the foundation of many of our pursuits. It is a very general law that desire excites pleasure, and aversion pain but the application of this law is not universal. Propensities however are prior to the experience of gratification, as in the case of the animal appetites. The supply of our wants, as exercise, and repose are necessary to our existence. The sensations of hunger and thirst, ren-

der us incapable of attending to any thing else. We have a natural disposition to exert our active powers; but the animal organs as well as the powers of the mind are limited. Lassitude comes on sooner or later according to the ardour with which the mind applies to any pursuit. When fatigued, the mind gradually sinks into repose.

These conclusions and observations on the mixed functions will afterwards be of use to us, when we come to consider the nature of the soul. By those powers it is that we view the material and intellectual world. In the exercise of the animal and mixed functions, there is little or no difference between one man and another, or even between man and the beasts. However various

the structure of the organs, and their use may be, they are common. It is only in consequence of these sensations that we are led into a train, that distinguishes man from man, and from the other animals. The talents of men distinguish them, as these talents are more or less adapted to their ends. Now these ends are either the discovery of truth, or the attainment of good. Truth sometimes refers to moral characters, and then it signifies veracity and fidelity. But this is not the sense in which it is here taken. Opinions may be either true or false, consequently they may be agreeable or contrary to the reality of things. Truth is a relation of things to opinions, and in this sense is considered by Metaphy-

sicians as a quality of things. A things being what it really is, is the definition of truth. In art truth is the correspondence of the work to the supposed rules of the art. The same thing holds in composition.

Good or evil consists in sentiments of Pleasure or Pain. For whatever is not matter of enjoyment, or suffering is indifferent. We speak however of a variety of things being good or evil, according as they do or do not fulfill our desires, still the essence of good or evil is in the mind, and is transferred only metaphorically to the subject itself. Without sentiment there can be no good or evil; for if one were possessed of all the riches that ever existed, and

had not the sentiment of pleasure, he can have no enjoyment; and if all the distresses which have been since the beginning of the world were heaped upon one head, without the sentiment of pain, he can have no suffering.

Lecture 25th

The great ends of all the pursuits of men, are, as I before observed, the discovery of truth, and the attainment of good. Truth is the object of understanding, good of will. Understanding includes all those faculties and operations, which lead us to the discovery of truth, as observation, memory, imagination, arrangement, and foresight. The source of knowledge, which relates to the mind itself

is consciousness; but when it relates to external objects it is called sensation. There are however many articles of knowledge, which are not the immediate consequence of consciousness, or perception by means of sensation. These articles are acquired by Investigation. In investigating causes we ought to collect a variety of appearances, in order to find some one general circumstance, by which we may account for others which are comprehended under it. Thus the motion of the heavenly Bodies, & Projectiles &c are explained on the principles of the general law of gravitation. There is a great variety of appearances in nature, as well as in human affairs. There is a great

difference of character, in different men, & even in the same person. If, when the wind is blowing along the direction of a river, we should attribute its course to this, we do not sufficiently account for it, for tho' the wind should blow opposite to it, it may be retarded, but not turned from its course. In order to come to a general conclusion, we must collect a number of facts, and consider not only the facts themselves, but likewise the particular circumstances relating to them. And the person who can collect most of these facts, will ~~most~~ probably succeed in arriving at a general conclusion. When a number of particulars agree in any thing, we clap them together under similitude. Thus we clap the

heavenly bodies under gravitation. We likewise by analogy reason from the past to the future, that is, we judge of the things which are to happen, by those which have already happened. But in this is implied observation, which is the first of those operations included under the understanding. Memory likewise, and imagination, are here referred to. History is the knowledge of particulars in detail. Natural History is descriptive; after you have described an animal, plant, or any other thing, which comes under this subject, you have finished all that can be said about it. In natural history likewise arrangement is for the ~~most part~~ useful. But civil history is

narrative; the characters of men are so different, that it is impossible to give any general description of them. The history of man has been coeval with the species. Altho' an individual may arrive at perfection with regard to himself, yet he is imperfect with respect to mankind. It is impossible that the observation of a single person should reach so far, as to be able without that of others, to judge of the history of man; except however we have observation of our own, we will not attend to that of any body else. It is of great advantage to us to compare the institutions of foreigners with those of our own country

that we may correct in our own, the faults which we may observe in them. For this purpose, travelling may be made extremely useful; but like other things from which great advantage might be reaped, it is subject to these two abuses. The first is when those who have been in foreign countries, affect to have forgot their own customs, and language, and use those of the countries in which they have been. But this is very absurd, for tho' the foreign language be preferable, yet their own is that which is used by those among whom they are to live. The other abuse is that young men are commonly sent to travell, when they should be forming

and cultivating their minds. When absent for a number of years, they become as it were strangers to their country, and unconcerned with its affairs. This inconvenience might be remedied, by making excursions rather than long & distant tours.

Lecture 26th

Observation is that proceeding of the mind, by which we collect facts, and which is necessary not only to conduct, but likewise to science. The greater a man's observation is, the greater figure will he make in any profession to which he applies. & then are his observation and experience brought to the test when he begins to apply them. Evidence arises either from our own senses, or from the Testimony

of others. In order to render the Testimony of others an evidence, we must believe it. We are naturally inclined to believe others as we doubt not their veracity, untill we have experienced the contrary. In giving an evidence, we ought to be without prejudice and views of Interest. When we speak of past things memory is referred to, which is that proceeding of the mind ~~by~~ in which past subjects are recalled. Memory is observed to decline along with our bodily strength, and is compared to wax, which when too much heated, retains not the impression made upon it, when moderately, retains the proper impression, when not at all, can

retain none. There are some men, who can at a considerable distance of time, remember a great many particulars, which have no thing important in them, but these men are commonly of a trifling disposition, and have nothing of more consequence, to which they may turn their attention. The most useful memory is that which retains the knowledge of those things, which will be of service in the conduct of life. The proper manner to remember a thing, is first thoroughly to understand it; when this is the case, it will occur to us on a small degree of recollection. The operations of memory are either casual or intentional. When the mention of one

thing, suggests others somehow connected with it, the memory of these things is said to be casual. For example if you hear of or meet with a man, whom you first saw on ship-board, you will immediately remember the ship, and other circumstances relating to it. Intentional memory is when the mind from design recollects any object. This is so evident that it needs no illustration. We have now done with the two first operations of the understanding, and next proceed to consider the third, which is the imagination.

Lecture 27th

Memory only refers to things past, whereas imagination likewise refers to things which

are to happen. By the imagination we con-
sider objects which are absent as present, &
those which are fictitious as real. It is
used in Poetry and History, where descrip-
tion is employed, rather than in the abstract Sciences
And thus we see that those men, who have
a genius for description, do not apply to
the different parts of Mathematics, and
the like. If we are to describe the sea, the
different colours which appear in it, occa-
sioned by the reflection of light from the
clouds, the shores & rocks which bound it,
and the ships which labour on its surface,
we exercise our imagination. By the ima-
gination we are led to call an affectio-

nate temper warm, and an indifferent temper, cold, and to use the like expressions.

Not only design, invention, and description depend on the imagination, but likewise passion or desire. In a work of the imagination, two or three probable circumstances, the trivial in themselves, give the whole the appearance of truth. Thus when Homer compares one of his battles to a storm, and mentions a shepherd ~~viewing~~ listening to the storm ~~from~~ upon the brow of a hill, we are apt to look upon it as real. In designing a performance, we collect by means of the imagination a number of particulars, out of which we chuse such

as will most please or affect the mind; and the man who with greatest judgement selects these particulars has a chance to succeed best in his performance. It deserves our observation, that design applies equally well to the conduct of life; for from a number of particulars our judgement directs us to choose those which will form the most proper plan for our operations. Invention likewise arises from the imagination. When we discover something new, as the form of an instrument, the structure of a machine, &c we are said to invent it. The question may occur, how far the imagination can go; whether or not by means of it, we can discover any thing

nes. In answer to this, we can combine the parts of different things, & form in our imagination what never existed in nature, as for example the Chimera, but we cannot invent new parts. In madness, or in the raving of a fever the imagination is so strong, that the person affected thinks the objects really present, whereas we have reason to hinder us from falling into this mistake. In such a condition, one imagines that the air is full of daggers, spirits, and furies; such extravagant fancies, does a redundancy of imagination occasion. I have already observed that description depends on the imagination;

this is employed in Poetry, History, and other works of the imagination. The propriety of description depends on the taste of author.

Lecture 28th

Abstraction differs from Imagination, as the first enables us to draw from a number of particulars some general conclusion, the other to consider things absent as present, and fictitious as real. Desire and Aversion arise from the imagination, and not from any set of external circumstances. For tho' all the men who ever existed were to be placed in the same situation, no two of them would

be equally happy or miserable. What appears Danger to one, is none to another; what is matter of terror to one, is matter of ridicule to another. Like children, who have been taught to connect the idea of fear with darkness and solitude, and who cannot get over this prejudice even when possessed of reason, like them, we connect the idea of happiness with riches and an exalted station, and the idea of misery with poverty and a low rank in life. Poetry is most nearly connected with the imagination, and although this art when kept within proper bounds, be innocent in itself,

yet it is ready to seize on the weakness of the mind, and on this account is it that Plato hath banished Poets from his Republick.

It now remains to treat of Analogy which is nearly related to the imagination By analogy bodies appear under agreement or disagreement. From agreement arise Metaphor, Allegory, and Similitude of parts or qualities. Thus a certain set of Bodies agree in the quality of Hardness. There likewise are other qualities in which plants and even animals agree. Some qualities are common to all beings, which are called by Metaphysicians the Attributes of Ens. General resemblance is

not the foundation of simile. The eye of a man has a resemblance to that of a horse, but the eye of a man is never metaphorically compared to the eye of a horse. There is another kind of resemblance, viz. that analogy, by which a likeness is traced between different bodies, and even between body and mind. This analogy arises from the conceptions of the mind, and that which is between body and mind is in great measure imaginary. Thus we compare light to knowledge, and darkness to ignorance. When different objects excite similar sentiments, they lay the foundation of a connection between the objects

themselves. As for example, we say a man is pierced with a sword, and metaphorically with anguish, thus we form a connection between a sword and anguish, altho' they have none in nature. In the same manner we connect a high tower with a man of dignity, and grandeur. This similarity of sentiment affords sufficient room for Metaphor Simile, and Allegory. When characters are described under images taken from subjects, which are very different in their nature, allegory takes place. Of this we have instances in the tablature of Cebes, in the

judgement of Hercules, as described by Xenophon, and in the allegory of Sin and Death in Milton.

Lecture 30th

I have already considered the history of the species, which part of our course I finished sometime since, and proceeded to the history of the individual. I observed that all the pursuits of man terminate either in the attainment of good, or in the discovery of truth; that good is the object of will, and that truth is the object of understanding. I have treated of observation, memory, and ima-

gination, which depend on the under-
standing, and which are necessary
to the execution of every performance.
The imagination is possessed by some
in a much higher degree than others
on which account the former succeed
much better than the latter in their
works of genius, particularly where
description is employed, in which
the imagination is most exercised.
Those men who are not endued with
a great degree of imagination, are
sometimes apt to condemn the writ
ings of such as have livelier and

warmer imaginations. Abstraction, as I said before, is different from imagination, on which account they are seldom found in the same person. Similitude, Metaphor, and Allegory do not take place in things of the same kind, but in such as have no connection in nature, which only some circumstance at first, and custom afterwards teaches us to combine. Thus we do not metaphorically compare one man to another, but the purling of streams, and verdant meadows to tranquillity

of mind. In enquiring into the Phenomena of nature, arrangement is necessary, which is the disposing of facts agreeably to the connection or relation they have in nature. It may be thought that arrangement is not a proper word, but that I should have chosen some other comprehensive one; I see however that it sufficiently expresses all it is meant to signify. We chiefly observe similitude, contiguity, cause and effect, in arrangement. Similitude is employed in natural or descriptive history; by it we divide

things into classes, genera, and species. Thus we may class all animals together as having something common; we again divide animals into volatiles, Quadrupeds, and reptiles, each of which is called a genus. Every genus is subdivided into a variety of different species, which are made up of individuals. Contiguity is used in narrative or civil History, and shews the relation which facts have one to another with regard to time or place. From the relation of cause and effect we connect objects of history in Theory. of causes there are two kinds, one by which

we account for effects, but which we cannot employ to produce them, as for example gravitation, the other kind by which we can actually produce the effects, thus after we know that a certain degree of heat will melt a certain quantity of metal, we can afterwards use a like degree of heat to melt a like quantity of metal. When we account for several appearances by one principle we form a Theory. By combining different Theories we produce a system.

Lecture 31st

I have observed that it is a general law of our nature to pafs

from the knowledge of one thing, to that of another. In order to this evidence is necessary, which may be divided into Perception, Interpretation and Investigation. Perception is received by the intervention of our bodily organs. There are no intermediate steps between the perception and evidence or belief, which is produced by consciousness. We are led by mere sensation to know the real qualities of Bodies, although they have no connection with the sensation itself. This takes place in Interpretation likewise, we

are led by the sign to the thing signifi-
ed. By this are we said to interprete.
That which passes in the minds of o-
thers is the subject of interpretation.
The Signs may be called Language, and
divided into natural and conventional.
Natural or fixed signs are the fea-
tures, the tone of the voice, and the like;
they are exhibited in one, and inter-
preted by another. The conventional
signs are written language, looks or
gestures. In all these cases the law
mentioned at the beginning of this lecture,
holds. We have an instance of In
vestigation in arrangement, where we

are lee from the observation of effects produced upon ourselves, to the knowledge of certain energies, which operate differently. When we collect energies we are said to investigate. In this is implied belief of something existing. I already observed that if all our knowledge flowed from consciousness there would be without doubt no such thing as evidence or argument. To percieve is the same as to believe, and is an ultimate and inexplicable fact in nature. Yet the sceptic requires evidence and argument in matters of perception as well as in matters of Interpretation and Investigation. Evidence

however is necessary when our knowledge is founded on the testimony of others.
In the Interpretation of nature there is place likewise for evidence, that is, there are intermediate steps between the perception and the thing signified, or between the effect and the reality of the cause. Here induction is employed, which is the inferring of some general law from a variety of particulars. As this may be more or less compleat, there are different degrees of evidence; consequently different degrees of certainty and doubt; for example it was for many ages doubted whether Gravitation was

universal, for some Bodies were supposed to possess a quality of levity as smoke flame &c; but from a more compleat induction, the ascent of these Bodies was found to be owing to the difference of specifick gravity. After an induction of a sufficient number of facts we are led by a law of our nature to believe. Notwithstanding men of speculation and abstraction require evidence in every case whatever. Thus they treat a case of perception as a case of investigation. The Septic destroys his own principles, for in all argument there must be something

supposed certain, to which the thing in question may be referred. The knowledge of the relation of cause to effect instructs us with regard to the future. The uniformity of nature leads us to the laws of nature. We are led to apprehend that what has taken place in one or two cases, will happen in all similar cases; as for example the burning of fire; upon this principle, we learn from the knowledge of one case, how to conduct ourselves in all similar cases. Upon this is founded what I have been

oblige to call foresight, though I am sensible that the common acceptation of the word is not what is here implied.

Lecture 32d

Foresight in the common acceptation of the word signifies a degree of sagacity which one man possesses over another in judging of characters, or any such like thing, but in the sense it is here taken which is discerning the future from the past, it is enjoyed by all men, even by changelings, and Idiots. Although the past be the principal object of our spe

culation, yet as active beings we are concerned to anticipate of future and our active faculties are only so far useful as they assist us in this important step. Foresight is founded on a law of our nature, or on a branch of the general law which is deduced from the uniformity of nature. All the grand operations of nature are uniform, as the rising and setting of the sun, the revolutions of the other heavenly bodies, the ebbing and flowing of the sea, &c ~~are uniform~~. Were this not the case, the world would be in continual confusion; did not the different seasons return at stated times,

the Husbandman would not labour the ground, and bury the seed, as he could not be certain of the ~~return~~ coming of harvest. We ought however to take care, not to depend too much on the uniformity of nature, for we are often apt to presume on it, where in fact it does not take place. Were we not disposed to anticipate the future from the past, we would be liable to great inconveniency. For tho' we have made repeated experiments on a body, yet when we come to a similar body, we would be obliged to go

through the same experiments. It is found that the profession of science often is a detriment to the practice of the arts, and the conduct of life. This is owing to abstraction; for example in the Mechanical Philosophy, when we reason concerning the force of a machine we abstract from the friction of the wheels, & the pressure of the parts; this may answer very well in Theory, but will not succeed in practice, for there cannot be a machine without friction and pressure of parts. Thus the most unskilful artist may construct a machine, better

than a man who is well versed in Science. In the same manner a Mathematician believes that the flight of a Projectile describes a Parabola, although in nature it takes a very different course. We are furnished by science with a rule, but if, instead of taking the assistance of this rule in the consideration of particular cases, we imagine that this rule is the knowledge of these cases, science will rather tend to mislead than direct us. In foresight, penetration and sagacity are necessary, by means of the first we comprehend the particular circumstances of any case,

by means of the other we perceive what is likely to follow from those circumstances. I shall not take up your time in illustrating this observation that art and skill are founded on penetration and sagacity, it is so evident, that it requires no explanation.

I have now done with the understanding, the object of which is truth. Good is the object of will, to which I now proceed. We may divide the will into Sentiment, Inclination, and Volition. Sentiment often produces pursuit. It is the beginning and End of every act of

the will. We may define sentiment the perception and enjoyment of good, or the perception and suffering of ill. We apprehend that there is some general cause of our Enjoyments and Sufferings, yet no progress hath been made in the discovery of the physical causes of them; this subject remains in great obscurity and uncertainty.

Lecture 33d

The object of sentiment is that to which it is referred as a cause. thus Provocation is the object of anger, and danger of fear. In common language, we

give the epithets good and evil to external objects; the connection between which and sentiment is in a great measure arbitrary. We must attend here to the meaning of cause and effect. Although sentiment is commonly referred to external objects as a cause, I am far from being of this opinion, for the operations of physical causes are regular, but no object in nature is productive of the same sentiment invariably either in any two different men, or in the same man at different times. We are led by our senses to a perception of the reality of external objects, or to a perception

of pleasure or pain. It is remarkable that although the first perception is uniformly and constantly the same, the second differs to different men, and even to the same man at different times. Thus in the case of a particular kind of food, all men are sensible of its existence, but its qualities appear different even to one and the same person in health and in sickness. But it may be said that the causes of pain are fixed, and it must be confessed that nature has been more anxious to guard us against great & imminent dangers than to allure us to these things that are

salutary and pleasant. All wounds, for example are painful; but this does not amount to a full or determinate exception to the general rule; that external objects are not the cause of sentiment. For no two wounds which are exactly similar, affect two different persons with the same degree of pain; and the man, who in the heat of an engagement heeds not a wound which he has received, would perhaps have fainted, by reason of its pain, had his blood been cool. We are then to conclude that the state of the organ and the ap-

prehension of the mind are the causes of animal sensation. When the active faculties of the mind are awakened, animal pleasures are indifferent. The cause then of animal pleasure is complicated. In the sentiments of fear, aversion &c. there is little foundation for exception to the general Rule. Some men can walk on the brink of a precipice without fear or concern while others tremble at the sight of it. Some expose themselves to the dangers of water, while the timidity of others will not allow them to venture upon it.

Even death itself, which ~~one~~ would imagine to be the general object of fear, is viewed by one man with much less terror than another. Thus no form of external objects is invariably pleasant or painful. The situations of men afford no exception to the general rule. The same situation whether in high or low rank affects different men in very different manner. ~~as therefore there is no fixed affects there can be no fixed relation of cause~~. The opinions which men in similar circumstances form of the external objects are the causes of their enjoyment and suffering. for example of two persons in the same situation the one is

often content and happy, while the other is discontent, and miserable; which plainly shows that opinions are the immediate causes of sentiment. If then there be a subject in the circle of science which deserves our particular attention, it certainly is, the enquiry into the source of these different opinions. These are not so much founded on the operations of the understanding as of the imagination; by it we consider one object as a constituent of pleasure and another as a constituent of pain. The minds of men are as it were haunted with different Spectres of things

thus objects which have nothing hurtfull in them become matter of danger, distrust and horror, and vice versa. The force of our opinions depends on established custom. We consider external marks of success as having a reference to the excellency and dignity of man. The imagination couples objects which have no connection in nature. In this manner it comes to pass that things which are in themselves perfectly indifferent become the sources of melancholy. These were called by the ancient Greek Philosophers φαντασιαι, ~~and~~ which are translated by

My Lord Shaftsbury, fancies. One spec-
tre of the imagination is banished by
another, thus the babbles of infancy
give place to the opinions of rank and
fortune.

Lecture 34th

I have showed that it is unphilosophi-
cal to look upon external objects as the
cause of sentiment, for no set of exter-
nal circumstances producing the same sen-
timent in two different persons or even in
the same at different times, they cannot
be assigned as a physical cause. Ob-
jects ~~which~~ are said to be good or

evil on account of their connection with sentiment, thus an object which uniformly and invariably occasions enjoyment is called good, and an object which uniformly and invariably occasions suffering is called evil. We ought to take care to form just opinions, as from these arise the principal benefits of Science; we are apt to fall into false opinions by degrees, and by degrees is it that we shake these off, and acquire just ones. I have shewed the connection between

the external objects, and Sentiment
I now go on to treat of sentiment
itself. There are four different kinds
of enjoyment and suffering, viz Sensati
ons of pleasure or pain, approbati
on or dislike, affection or hatred, ex
ercise or languor. Sensations of plea
sure and its reverse are recieved by
the intervention of our bodily organs.
And the sensations are pleasant or
painful apart, without our knowledge
of the cause. If for example you ap
ply Sugar to the Tongue of a child

the sensation which is recieved by the child is pleasant and agreeable although it can have no conception of the cause, and cannot reason from the effect to the cause. In the whole of an enjoyment or suffering, there are many particulars, which may be taken seperately, and referred to different causes. Thus in the case of eating, the Epicure joins imagination and opinion to the mere pleasure of taste, for the poor relish their coarse and plain fare more than the rich their splendid and elegant entertainments, for the most part. Although

the epicure think that pleasing his taste is the only object he has in view, yet there are opinions of rank, elegance and distinction, which are inseperably connected with the pleasures of the Table. The effect then is not limited to animal pleasure, but likewise extends to the pleasures of the imagination.

The second class, viz approbation and dislike, is very different from the former. To approve is to enjoy, and to dislike is to suffer, or be in pain.

Some writers who have treated of this subject, have here used the expression

internal sense sensation; but when the term sense is applied to our approbation and dislike, it is apt to mislead us. for unless we attend to its being used in a metaphorical sense, we imagine that sentiments of approbation and dislike come to the mind by the intervention of some bodily organ. Beauty is an object of approbation, and its Physical cause is supposed to depend on form. The ingenious Mr Hogarth has discovered an irregular waving line to be the cause of Beauty,

and proves it by showing that those objects which we call beautiful, abound most in these lines, and that those which we call ugly, have fewest of them. There are other sources of pleasure, besides form, to wit utility, symmetry of parts &c. The mind takes a pleasure in discovering a resemblance in parts, and enjoys in having some thing to exercise itself upon, provided this be not fatiguing. Were this not the case, our active faculties implanted in us by God would be of no use.

Lecture 35th

I have shown that in the whole of an enjoyment or suffering, there are seperate particulars which are referred to different causes. Thus the voluptuary who professes no other pursuit but that of animal pleasure, connects with it likewise Imagination and opinion. We come now to the third class, viz. Affection and Hatred. Here likewise we enjoy and suffer; for we enjoy on ac-

count of the delight which we receive from the welfare or good of the object of our affection, and suffer on account of the pain we receive from its ~~the~~ unsuccess or evil. Affection is the cause of the greatest pleasure; it occasions love, friendship, and the like with the agreeable ~~sensations~~ are. But Hatred creates revenge, and the other passions which tear and harrass the mind, We are naturally inclined to be affectionate, and feel for our fellow creatures who are in distress, and

likewise for the other animals. In proportion as we imagine that the objects of our affection are affected with pain, are we ourselves affected, thus an operation performed on a living Body affects more than the same operation performed on a dead Body. At first we feel some pain at seeing a dead carcase mangled and cut in pieces, as we cannot seperate the idea of the pain which the person would have felt had he been alive. The things which come under

this class present themselves under a variety of aspects. When they appear under a hostile aspect, they become the sources of misery to us, but when under a friendly and amicable aspect, the foundation of the purest enjoyment of which Human nature is capable. But these sentiments may be greatly diversified, and from this arises that variety of sentiments, which men entertain of each other. This variety of sentiments is universal, & even extends to the other animals. Such of them as we

see peaceable and gentle we imagine to be of an affectionate and friendly disposition, and such as we see fierce and unsociable, we look upon as of a revengeful and malicious disposition. Our affection is strongest where the object of it is most sentient. Smiles Blushes &c are only the faintest expressions of a mind which is variously affected and agitated with love, candour, and admiration towards other sentient Beings. But the natural effects of these sentiments may be frustrated

by a Collision of interests. Affection sometimes precedes every sentiment of Esteem, of Perfection, or Admiration. Thus the instinctive feelings of the Parent are previous to esteem. But still Esteem and Affection are united, the former is produced by the latter. hence it is that the Affections of men blind their Judgement, and make them apprehend merit where in reality there is none; and where there is, exaggerate it greatly. When Hatred seizes the mind of a man and when he is

driven on by revenge to that false satisfaction, his anxiety of mind is for the most more intolerable than before. The next class is Exercise and Languor. Of all enjoyments there is none more pleasing, than that of having some object in view, which we follow with unremitted ardour, and on the contrary there is no suffering more irksome than that of having no thing to do, to express which I have with some difficulty found the word Languor. Exercise is divided into three different kinds the first is when a work is imposed on

is by another, & this is called a Task. This is seldom or never agreeable, as we look upon it as a restraint upon our will. The second kind is when we voluntarily apply to some object, as the attainment of a fortune, the serving a friend &c. This is called Business. The third kind is called Amusement, which takes place, when the mind is not occupied with any object of pursuit. For it is natural to man to employ his active faculties, and when he has not an object

in view, he will turn his attention to pleasures and amusement.

Lecture 36th

Our enjoyments in almost every case, depend on opinion. The human mind conscious of itself cannot subsist without being engaged and occupied. There is no business or amusement which does not exercise some active faculty of the mind: There is no state so painful as that which approaches to an entire want of occupation; it is the source of

every evil passion, and often termi-
nates in madness. Yet retirement
from business is the end which all
men have in view. But still they
must employ themselves in frivo-
lous pursuits. I have now finished
the first part of the will viz. Senti
ment and come now to Inclination.
which is a disposition to act without
however producing any action. Eve
ry inclination may be considered in
respect to itself, to its end, or to its
object. When considered in respect

to itself, Inclination is of three kinds, a propensity, a desire, and a mixture of both. There must be a disposition to act, before we experience the enjoyment or ~~pleasure~~ resulting from the gratification. This holds as well in the case of the other animals, as of man. Propensities are either ~~or~~ original, or acquired by habit, independant of reflection or design. As the beating of the Heart, the motion of the Pupil &c.

The exercise of these natural propensities becomes the foundation of habit,

which take from hold of our nature.
We have Desires which depend on
the apprehension of some good, and
which have a reference to all our
enjoyments, so that they may perhaps
be ranged with respect to the classes
of our sentiments already mentioned.
Desires may become Propensities, and
it is as difficult to cure these created
by misguided Imagination as to stifle
an original Propensity. The end
of our propensities is the preservation
of Life and the Improvement of our

mind. Thus the beating of the heart tends to the preservation of life. Curiosity too is a propensity wisely implanted in our mind by nature, as it is necessary to our Information. Desire is an intentional act of the mind directed by the apprehension of some supposed good. There ought to be different classes of desires, suited to their objects. Thus they may be divided into Sensuality, Desire to excell, and Benevolence. Exercise and Amusement might comprehend the whole of our active dispositions. But in common life

the chafes of desires depend more on casual opinions, than the actual desires of our nature, suited to real natural objects. We must therefore divide them into the desire of pleasure, the desire of eminence, and the desire of safety. The Desire to excel depends on the courses on which men enter, and is natural to man. It hath been alledged by some men that there is no such thing as Benevolence, but that we always act from a selfish principle. This question must be determined by the Experience of Mankind –

Lecture 37th

I was last considering the question whether we act from a selfish or Benevolent principle. It is scarcely to be doubted that but the Affection of the Parent is really benevolent, which with other instances which might be produced shews that this is not always the case that we act from a selfish Principle. The desire of knowledge, wisdom &c can not come under the denomination of selfish, as they tend to promote the good of others. When the end is

within our reach to desire and to enjoy is the same, thus if I desire to raise my arm, I can as easily accomplish it as desire it. But when the end is precarious, the sentiment under the influence of the desire is various. When the event turns out contrary to our desire, it occasions that sort of pain which we call disappointment. Hope and Fear are passions which arise from the same desires, & these are proportioned to the value which we put on the objects. According as

we succeed or not in our pursuits we are affected with joy or grief. The person whose character is formed on Animal pleasure, or Interest becomes insolent proud and vain when he attains his end. When he is frustrated in his pursuits he is affected with grief, but of a very different kind from that of those whose characters are formed on sentiments of candour and benevolence. As the interested must stand in competition with other men, they must

view the rest of mankind under a hostile aspect; they become jealous, and have a mixture of fear, hatred, and aversion. On the other hand they who do not state mankind under the former aspects, are restrained from insolence and vanity by sentiments of candour and humanity. Their joy and hope is candid and just and tho' their grief and disappointment occasion pain, yet it is greatly alleviated by the enjoyment which inseperably attends an Affectionate Temper. Thus

are these Passions greatly diversified
tho' their name be the same. We ought
to follow out our best Talents and Dis-
positions; it is always in our power
to do our best, and in this consists true
wisdom. The minds of men are actuated
by a variety of different passions. The
love of pleasure, views of interest which
encroach upon the properties of others,
and the consciousness of having done
amiss create shame and remorse.
whereas a contrary course creates
Joy and Satisfaction —

Lecture 38th.

I have observed that men are differently affected with sensations of pleasure and pain, with joy and grief with regard to the past, and with hope and fear with regard to the future. I have now done with the two first parts of the will and proceed now to the last which is volition. This is the determination of the mind to follow an inclination. When we have made our choice Volition proceeding with design constitutes

an action. Every act of this kind is an object of approbation, and consequently of reward, or an object of censure, and consequently of punishment. The choice of motives constitutes freedom of mind. There have been many long and needless disputes concerning Liberty and necessity. Some men allege that we are destined by fate to do certain things which it is not in our power to hinder. If we state the facts as they arise in the mind, we do all that can be done with respect to the subject.

In some cases however we are under some degree of necessity. Though they may appear to give their consent, yet they are forced to it; as in the case of a man robbed on the high way. But there ~~are~~ is still here room for moral praise and blame. Men even when under a degree of force incur blame, and are subjects of disapprobation, when they choose a greater evil to avoid a less, and are menaced into any base and unjust action. Thus if a man to save his own life should be forced

by another to take away the life of a third man who is innocent, he would certainly be culpable: The patrons of necessity do not pretend to deny that we are accountable for those actions which depend on the will, but begin with considering the immutable connection of cause and effect, in the order of nature, and the human mind, the operations of which, as they imagine, making part of this established order, are as fixed and unalterable as the agitation of the air, and sea, &c. There is here a great error, for suppose that the operations of the

human will were as fixed as the motion of the air & sea, still there is no analogy between a subject merely mechanical, and one which is intellectual In the former there is no moral good or evil, no foundation for praise or blame, reward, or punishment, whereas in the latter there is a design and an end in view. But even though necessity were to take place with regard to the will, yet a candid and humane temper is praise worthy, and constitutes happiness, but an ungenerous, and cruel tem-

per is culpable, and constitutes Misery.
Were a criminal to plead necessity to his judge, the judge may say that the same necessity which obliged the criminal to commit the crime, obliges him to punish it. And as the pannel was forced by necessity to commit the crime, it would be proper to take him out of society, lest the same necessity should again oblige him to commit another crime. Therefore this would rather serve to condemn than save him.

Lecture 39th

It now remains to draw some general inferences from what has been said with regard to the history of man. We see what diversity of capacity and parts takes place in different characters. It is not as in the other animals, where each species follows some instincts common to every individual in that species. Thus the raven is led by instinct to build her nest upon a rock, and

to use the same materials invariably for that purpose. The brutes have no occasion for observation, as their natural instincts are sufficient to supply all their wants, whereas man is wisely ordered to exercise his invention and other faculties of his mind to procure the necessaries and conveniences of life. It is likewise wisely ordered by nature that men should have different degrees of capacity and parts, as one man by his superior Talents is enabled to

against another, whose parts are less considerable. The same degree of capacity and parts differently improved fits two men to make very different figures in Life. One by proper application and a due improvement arrives at eminence in the profession in which he is placed, while the other by indolence and inactivity, becomes a burden to himself and a burden to society. When we apply to any pursuit with unremitted ardour, we will be active and steady untill we produce our end, but when

we are agitated by extreme passions of hope or fear, joy or grief, we are apt to be interrupted and misguided in our conduct. It is generally observed that those men who are flushed with joy upon any trifling success, are dejected upon any small and inconsiderable misfortune. Fear when possessed of a weak mind, banishes every noble and laudable desire, and sinks it into retirement and indolence. And if any spark of activity remains, it can serve no end, as the person is removed

from that situation in which it might be of use. It hath been long disputed in the schools of Philosophy what is the state of nature. Some men allege that men were in a state of nature when they lived in caves and clothed themselves with the skins of the beasts which they slew in hunting, but I some time ago observed that it is when we can to the best advantage employ the best faculties of our mind.

All men of speculation divide the subjects of their enquiry into Mind & Matter,

the properties of which have no analogy to one another. Extension, Impenetrability and Divisibility, which take place in matter are not to be found in Mind. And as Divisibility renders all matter subject to corruption, Mind not being possessed of this Quality is a proof of the Immortality of the Soul.

Lecture 40th.

I was last considering the difference between Matter and Mind, the former of which is possessed of Qualities, which are not in the latter.

The vis inertia which universaly takes place in matter shews the difference between it and Mind; As matter never moves except when some external force is impressed upon it, whereas Mind is of itself active. It may be alledged that like matter mind may be divided, & that its faculties are distinct parts of a complicated nature; but these are only separate names given to different acts of the same being. Nothing in nature is ever annihilated, but the particles of matter are dissolved, and assume different figures. Mind not being subject to a

dissolution of Parts is physically immortal. This might likewise be proved from the goodness and providence of God But we shall not make use of this argument here, as we have not as yet proved his Being and Attributes. By a law of our nature we are led to apprehend the existence of external objects by the intervention of our bodily organs. We are likewise led by a law of our nature to observe certain external appearances, with which the existence of mind is inseparably

and necessarily connected. We here discover wisdom and design in other sentient beings analogous to ourselves. Some of these we discover by laws of our nature, and other by Experience. Thus in a piece of workmanship we measure the ingenuity and skill of the workman by the work. We judge of the parts and capacity of men by their conduct in life. We learn the existence of mind not only from our conduct in life, but likewise from things in nature; we see design & judgement in e=

Every part of the Creation.

Lecture 41st

We are by a law of our nature led to the belief of an intelligent principle within us. As the term final cause is often here made use of it will not be improper to explain it. There is for every thing an efficient and a final cause. Thus in the circulation of the blood, the efficient cause is the muscular power of the heart, which protrudes the blood into the arteries, and from thence into the veins over the whole Body

But the final cause is that the Body may receive a proper degree of nourishment. Every final cause depends upon the Deity, so that if you mention a final cause you imply in it the existence of God. It would be the highest degree of presumption to pretend to know the final causes of every thing; this would be to suppose the reason of man to keep pace with the wisdom of God. Yet we can go a certain length with evidence; we can perceive the mutual connections and dependencies of things. And our knowledge of

final causes is always proportioned to our knowledge of these connections. Natural History is a fertile source of the belief of final causes. Those who study the structure of the human Body have many opportunities to observe final causes, which are not only apparent in the separate funtions, but likewise in the combination of the parts, and their operations to some common end. We see that the situation of every animal tends to its preservation, both with regard to its Element, and other

circumstances. The weak and timid are endued with a greater degree of swiftness than the bold and strong. The Vegetable kingdom no less than the animal furnishes us with a great variety of final causes. The surface of the globe is necessary not only to the preservation of animal life, but of vegetation. It has not a sufficient quantity of moisture itself, but receives it from the Exhalations of the Sea. Some men however look upon the

vast extent of sea as a defect in nature. But this ~~however~~ is of the greatest service, for the vapours exhaled from it driven along in the air, hang in it, untile their specifick gravity becomes heavier than that of the air. They then fall down in dew, rain, hail, and snow and water the earth, which would otherwise be dry and parched. We ought not then to complain of the vast extent of sea, as, if it were either greater or less, the system of nature would be in danger of being throw into

confusion. The inequality of the surface of the globe hath likewise been looked upon by some as a defect in nature. But this serves a wise purpose in the oeconomy of the world; for the clouds being broke by the Tops of the mountains, the water is distributed over the low grounds, and forming Springs, Rivulets, and Rivers, returns to the sea from whence it was formerly exhaled. Were the globe's surface smooth and level, the rain would stagnate, and render it one continued marsh, which would make it as impro-

per for land animals to live in as the Sea itself. The variety of ground is wisely fitted to the different natures of different animals. We may likewise deduce many final causes from the System of the heavenly Bodies. The sun that source of light and heat is as it were hung as a balance to all the other orbs. They move round him as their center of gravity, and were not this invariably the case, disorder and confusion would ensue. It would be foolish and vain in me, to attempt to ex

haust so extensive a subject, I have only mentioned a few particulars, to lead you into the method of observation.

Lecture 42d

In our last I endeavoured to explain the term final cause which so often occurs, particularly in our study of the works of nature. There is a great variety in the minds of sentient Beings, which we discover from their different productions. Thus from reading the Poems of Homer, or the Commentaries of Cæsar, you can judge them-

2 to have been men of taste and genius
And though I am sensible that the com
mentaries of Cæsar have been looked u
pon by some school Boys as wrote merely for the use of schools, yet there are marks of the greatest sagacity and knowledge of human affairs. We see Design and Wisdom in every part of the universe which we attribute to a being who presides over the rest and whom we call Almighty God As all men see the effects of his de-

2 sign and wisdom, it might be thought that they would form the same conceptions of him, notwithstanding of this some men have believed in a plurality of Gods. This mistake, in my opinion, may have very naturally crept into them in the following manner. As every man is inclined to imagine that he is the particular care of the Deity, two rivals equally thinking that they are favoured by God, come to believe that there are two Gods, who are likewise

rivals. Hence arose the Dii Penates who were thought to preside over particular families. In the same manner each city and nation had their tutelar Gods, there were Gods of the sea, air, Fire, woods, &c. Thus by combining the different opinions which they entained of Almighty God, and forgetting what gave rise to these opinions, they come to believe in a plurality of Gods. There is no foundation for this belief, but the apprehensions which different

men form of the Deity, for the agreement which takes place in nature plainly shew that there is but one supreme being in the universe. By his works we are led to consider his attributes which are Power, Wisdom, Goodness, and Justice.

His Power we may judge to be infinite for who but an infinitely powerful Being could have raised the stupendous fabrick not only of this world, but likewise of the universe. He must likewise have infinite Wisdom to direct his Power, if not he might make improper uses of it

and employ it rather to the hurt than advantage of his creatures. And were he not possessed of infinite Goodness and Justice, his wisdom might become craft and cunning. As he is a being of such perfection, many have wondered why there is so great a portion of evil in the world. It was long believed among the ancients, and the belief was revived in the third century of the Christian Æra by Manichæus who gave his name to a sect, which followed his opinion, that an evil and a good being presided over the universe,

who were continually acting in opposition to one another. But that which appears evil to us often turns out for our good and that which is evil in the eyes of one man, is good in the eyes of another. It may be asked why Almighty God created man so imperfect; in answer to this, were man sensible of no want or deficiency he would sink into Indolence and Inactivity. The active faculties implanted in him would serve no end, as he would have no object to pursue,

Lecture 43

The Defects which take place in man constitute part of his Happiness for they are a spur to action, wherein consists the exercise of the best faculties of the mind. Man is naturally inclined to admire and love, but when his attention is turned towards the Deity, his admiration and love are turned into veneration and filial affection. On these is founded Natural Religion, which needs no expression with regard to the object

himself; for the upright heart is the temple of the living God. But with regard to mankind expressions are necessary, as example contributes much to promote every thing. The expressions of Religion are either fixed or arbitrary. Those actions which concur with the providence of God to promote the good of his creatures are the fixed expressions of Religion. The arbitrary expressions are the different ceremonies and institutional observances by which the sentiments of veneration may be expressed in different a-

ges and countries. And tho' the ceremonies and institutions of others be different from those which we ourselves observe, we ought ~~not~~ on that account to condemn them. It is our Duty to chuse the path of virtue, and do that which is right. The success of our attempts and the events of our actions are reserved to God. I some time ago proved the immortality of the soul from its not being subject to dissolution. Having now fixed the existence and attributes of God we are able to draw a further argument

from his providence and goodness. Some men have endeavoured to prove this in following manner. As in this life the wicked are happy and the good miserable, the justice of God is bound to punish the former, & reward the latter in the world which is to come. But this argument is false and erroneous, for the wicked tho' successful are not really happy, nor the good tho' unfortunate really miserable in this present world. For were not this the case, we could have no reason to think that the wicked will

be miserable, & the good happy in the world to come, as we can only judge of what will happen, by what has already happened. We ought to conclude that as the wicked are miserable in this world the justice of God will make them so in the next, and that as the good are happy in this world, they will be likewise happy in the next. I have now done with the first part of our course in which we have treated of human nature Physically, and proceed to the second, in which we shall treat of it

morally. We have considered what man is and hath been, and shall now go on to consider what he ought to be.

Lecture 44th

Before I give any particular account of what is the good or evil which man experiences, you will please to recollect some observations on science in general, which I made at the beginning of our course. In the first place considered as an attainment of the mind, science is the knowledge of general principles, which may have a variety of

ends or views. we may enquire what is, and what ought to be. When our object is to enquire what is, we collect facts and general laws, and apply them to appearances, and when this application is not at first sight obvious, this is what I call Physical Science, and it may be various, as the subjects to which we turn our attention are various. When the Mind is considered as an object of Physical Science we find man labouring under Defects of the Under-

standing and of the Heart; but in Moral science all that is required is if the Excellence is competent to the nature of man. we are to shew what man ought to be, to what he tends, and what he ought to aim at, and not to what any individual has arrived. Our Divisions are in a great measure arbitrary. That which regards the Mind is commonly called Moral Philosophy; But several inconveniences arise from this. Thus some men of speculation attending to the Physical nature of mind alone think that they are

building Systems of moral Philosophy.
hence for many ages, the Investigation of
the principles of moral approbation
and dislike has been substituted in
the room of moral Philosophy; and the
enquiry into what would make us suc-
cessful and happy in our pursuits, has
been wholly overlooked. The test of our
improvement in Physical Science lies in
our having collected a number of particu
lars which lead us to the knowledge
of general laws, but the test of our im
provement in moral science lies in our

own conduct. The arrangement of our sentiments and conclusions with regard to what is good is an important step in this progress. The terms Principle and Law which we made use of in Physical science is equally applicable in moral science. As in the first a Law is, what is, so in the second it is what ought to be. This is the most extensive Definition of the term, moral law. First a thing ought to be because it is good, next because it is stipulated, and this called the Law of Con-

vention, and lastly because commanded by a superior who can enforce the law. The last is the sense in which it is taken by lawyers, although it is only a branch of the general term law. The Definition which I have given of it comprehends all the Divisions and Subdivisions of law adopted by different writers. In every law there is an obligation. The common sense in which it is taken by lawyers is the will or command of a Superior, but this is limited. If there be a reason for the law it can

stitutes an obligation, independant of the command of any Superior, which can only render the breach of the law a greater evil than it is in its own nature.

Lecture 45th

I have already said that the terms Principle, Law, and System, which we had occasion to make use of in speaking of Physical Science, are equally applicable in Moral Science. I have likewise shewn the different branches of the general term Law, which is far more comprehensive

than most men are aware of. The laws of morality which regard man, relate either to his mind and happiness, or to his external condition, and to his duties in civil life. When good relates to the human mind, it is expressed in a variety of terms, such as Pleasure, Virtue, and Happiness. I here take Pleasure in the most extensive sense of the word; from the agreeable sensation produced by the smell of a flower to the most exquisite enjoyment. What ever one would wish to retain I call Pleasure, and whatever one

would wish to remove I call Pain.

Men of different Constitutions are very variously affected with Pleasure and Pain. Some are not in the least degree sensible of things which would occasion enjoyment or suffering to others, whose senses are more acute. Pleasure does not signify the same thing in our language with what it signifies in any other language compared to it. Thus the Greek word ἡδονη, and the Latin voluptas are translated Pleasure, although there is a difference in meanings of

them. I shall lay down six Physical Laws of our nature relative to pleasure and pain, and endeavour to illustrate them as they lie in order. The first is that the use of things salutary and requisite to animal preservation, is pleasant, and what is pernicious, is painful. Thus food and exercise which are necessary to the preservation of life, are universally pleasant to those who enjoy good Health. It is no objection to this general Rule, that certain Drugs, which are necessary, are unpleasant, for they were

intended by nature, to be only necessary when the Body is out of order.

Lecture 46th

I yesterday began to mention the six Physical Laws, relative to pleasure and pain, and shall now go on to explain them. The second is that the sense of any perfection is pleasant, of any defect, painful. Thus when we are conscious that we are candid and just, we are affected with pleasure, but when we are conscious that we are neither candid nor just, we are affected with shame

and remorse. The third rule is that Affection is pleasant, and Hatred is painful. This is so evident and so invariably the case, that it requires no explanation. The fourth is that Hope and Joy are pleasant, Grief and Fear are painful. But these Passions, grafted on Affection or Hatred, partake greatly of the nature of the Disposition from which they arise. They affect some in a much greater degree than others, who are not of so warm a temper. The fifth Rule is that Exercise either of the

Body or Mind is pleasant. This is a Proof of the Beneficence of nature, the making that thing so agreeable which is necessary to our Preservation. The sixth is that Habit, in some instances, can change the source of our pleasures and pains. Thus in the case of some Drugs and Spirituous Liquors, which are universally unpleasant at first, the Persons who have accustomed themselves to them, become so fond of them, that they cannot abstain from the use of them.

In all animal pleasures, the wants of nature are soon satisfied, and when we desire to prolong the gratifications they become pernicious to us instead of being salutary. For example, if after we have allayed our hunger, we desire to prolong the pleasure of eating, we are perhaps laying the foundation of future Diseases. The same holds in every other Animal Gratification. Different pleasures are the objects of pursuit to different Men.

Some pursue those pleasures which really constitute Happiness, and which depend upon themselves, while others desire to obtain those pleasures, which are transitory, and which do not depend on themselves, as Dress, Equipage, and the like. As the pursuits of the former are extremely different from those of the latter so are their effects. The pursuits of the one tend to promote the good of mankind, while those of the other tear them to commit acts of injustice.

Lecture 47th

I was last considering the first of the three terms in which good relatively to the human mind is expressed, viz Pleasure. Some Pleasures render us sensual, slothful, and unfit to act a part in society, while others render us diligent and active. I now come to treat of the second, viz Virtue, which renders Man the object of esteem and of praise. Most men look

upon that as constituting virtue,
which is the custom and fashion of
the times. In those states in which
the practice of war prevails, virtue
is placed in the military excellencies
as courage, and the like. Thus among
the Romans, the word Virtus had an
immediate reference to valour in war.
In a state where the members en-
joy peace, mildness, the polite arts, as
eloquence &c are looked upon as vir-
tues. Among merchants, they con-

sist in a skill of commerce, and a proper degree of œconomy. Thus every set of men imagines that those customs which prevail among them are virtues. We ought then to take care what customs and fashions take place among us, as they are to be rules of our conduct, and are to entitle us to esteem and praise. It is the subject of moral Philosophy to point out in what real virtue consists. As Man is by nature the member of a com-

munity, he is qualified by virtues to procure the good of that community of which he is a member. The requisites necessary to this are candour, justice, prudence, resolution, force of mind, benevolence and affection. And when a man is not possessed of these qualifications, he has no pretensions to virtue, and is unfit to be accounted a good member of society. We look upon all men as well as ourselves under one or the other of the aspects of excellence

or meanness. The first of these we must approve of, and the other we must contemn, although contrary to the fashion of the times. Thus when a Poet or a Historian describes describes a character which is bold, generous and affectionate, we cannot help agreeing with him in approving that character; and again if he describe one which is timirous, selfish, jealous and envious, we cannot forbear from condemning it, though, were we to follow the fashion of the times, they would

lead us to be of a very different opinion. There are certain duties which every man owes to his fellow creatures in every age, and in every situation, the performance of which constitutes excellence, and the neglect of which constitutes meanness. If we are not satisfied with reasoning a priori, let us appeal to our Hearts, and see if we are not affected with admiration, at candour and the other virtues, and with contempt, at jealousy, &c.

Lecture 48th

We may divide Virtue into four parts which are called the cardinal virtues, viz. Justice, Prudence, Temperance, and Fortitude. These correspond to the four requisites to virtue, viz Disposition, Skill, Application, and Force. I do not here mean to treat of the external effects of virtue, but to speak of it as it stands in the mind; for the other will come in more properly after-

wards. The first which is justice; respects not only our relations and connections, but likewise the whole of Mankind. It is a false and limited view of justice to imagine that it extends only to our friends, for when we think that we are rendering justice to them we are perhaps wronging others. Justice in the common sense of the word which is the observance of the laws under which we live, is but a small part of the whole Duty. For a man

may be barely just, and yet have no degree of virtue. Selfishness is for the most part opposed to Justice. This is always the case when we strive to promote our own interest at the expence of others. But when we are selfish with regard to the attainment of knowledge, and the improvement of our mind, we do not incur the title of injustice as by this we tend to advance the good of mankind. Justice may appear under various aspects, and have diffe-

rent names. It is a disposition to Innocence, to give no offence; to candour generosity, Humanity &c. Prudence is likewise a necessary part of Virtue. Except we have prudence to direct our affection towards our friends, it may prove pernicious to them. We may act like the Bear in the fable; where to drive away a fly from the face of his friend, he knacked him in the head with a stone. Prudence respects not

only our private pursuits, but likewise our pursuit of the general good of mankind, and requires Penetration Sagacity, Skill, and Knowledge. But these will be of very little use, except we have Application and Steadiness to pursue with unremitted ardour our chief and principal design. This is expressed by the term Temperance which is the third cardinal virtue. intemperance in the common acceptation

tion of the word signifies Excess in Animal Gratifications, but it likewise includes an attention to frivolous Amusements, which often prove as pernicious as Animal Gratifications.

Lecture 49th

The term Virtue is properly applicable to the perfection of mans nature alone. But it is likewise taken in a Metaphorical sense. Thus a capacity in any thing to produce a certain end is said to be a Virtue, and when the thing loses that capacity, it is said to lose

the Virtues. Justice signifies a due regard to the good of mankind. Terence seems to refer to this when he says, Homo sum, et nihil humanum a me alienum puto. The truly good man will every where be grieved at the misery of his fellow creatures, and rejoice at their good. Prudence consists in the discernment of what will contribute to the good of Society. Temperance is that force and application of Mind which is necessary to guard us against

the excess of animal Gratifications, and frivolous amusements, & avocations. These are the more dangerous, that they sometimes have the air of business, and when we are pursuing them, we imagine that we are acting a decent and proper part in life. I already observed that the scene in which we are placed, and our nature are admirably adapted to one another; as the sword to the Scabbard, and the Scabbard to the Sword. In this world we have not only external difficulties and dangers to

struggle with, but likewise fears and apprehensions to overcome, and this is one great object of Fortitude and Courage. As Temperance is the ascendant of the Mind over animal gratifications, and frivolous pursuits, so Fortitude is the ascendant of the Mind over apparent difficulties and dangers. The notions of Fortitude differ in different countries and ages. When Socrates whom no one with justice could tax with cowardice received a blow on the Street, all that he said was, that had he foreseen it

he would have brought a shield with him. Themistocles too in the expedition against Xerxes, receiving a stroke in council for opposing another general, calmly replied, "Strike on, provided you will "follow my advice." By such a conduct however they could not at present have escaped the impeachment of cowardice. An officer in the King of Prussia's army having been beat by him, immediately discharged one pistol over the head of his Sovereign, and another into

his own Breast. Independant of whatever notions prevail in different countries and ages, the unwearied pursuit of what we think our Duty, constitutes Fortitude. In proportion as we are engaged with more or less ardour in our pursuits, are we possessed of a greater or less degree of Fortitude. Homer in his character of Achilles has furnished us with a beautiful example of the greatest courage and resolution. As fear is a passion of the Mind, *

requires resolution to overcome it, we may observe that there may be virtue in the mind, independant of external actions. The different parts into which virtue is divided are objects of Esteem when taken separately, though they are often misap plied: as a sword is good of itself, and may be of service, although it is often used improperly. I have now consider ed the two first parts of good relative ly to the human mind, viz Pleasure and Virtue; and shall make this general observation, that as pleasure is matter

of Enjoyment, Virtue is matter of approbation.

Lecture 50th

We come now to consider the third part of good relatively to the human mind viz Happiness. under Pleasure we judged of the different kinds of Enjoyments, and under Virtue of the different apprehensions of men, we are now under happiness to judge of what is greatest and best. Happiness is an attribute of sentient nature alone, and is expressive of that

state which contains the greatest en-
joyment, and least suffering. We are ac
customed to think and act as if happi-
ness lay in the external objects, while
it lies in our mind alone. When we fear
we imagine the cause of the fear is in
the external object. Hence arise the diffe
rent opinions of Mankind. It hath been
often disputed whether Happiness is to
be found in a town or a country Life, a-
mong the young or old, rich or poor.
We ought first to establish what we ac

cannot happy, and then might we enquire how far this is connected with any set of external circumstances, or whether one situation is more connected with Happiness than another. Without pursuing this subject any farther, I shall go on to observe that if a man has the constituents of Happiness in his own mind, he may be happy in all the variety of situations in which he can be placed; whether in the air or in house, in solitude or in company. I had already occasion to

remark that sentiment alone constitutes Happiness or Misery. Whatever connection there may be between external objects and enjoyment or suffering, it is of the greatest importance to remember that they exist in the mind alone. The Extent of Enjoyment and Suffering is infinitely various in the different animals from the shell fish which lies upon the strand to the most active of our own species; and in all these gradations there is a certain proportion between the enjoyment and suffering, and the

extent of the powers. The author of nature has introduced this variety not only among the different Species, but likewise among the individuals of the same species, particularly of our own, for reasons of which it is probable we are not competent judges. Our Business at present is only to examine the facts. In proportion as the individuals of our own species differ in the gifts of understanding, and affections of the heart, they likewise differ in the degrees of Enjoy

ment and Suffering. These differences are partly original and partly adventitious. In so far as they are original, the Author of nature seems to have intended different degrees of Happiness to different Men; but in so far as they are adventitious, our Happiness depends upon ourselves. It is a fact, that no man ever was so perfect, as not to be capable of farther improvement, and no man so defective as not to be capable of removing in some measure his defects. We ought to set up a model or standard to our selves at ~~to~~

which we ought to endeavour to arrive. To this standard different men approach in different Degrees, and their approaches are proportioned to the vigour with which they act. It is a false and erroneous opinion of Happiness, to imagine that it consists in attaining to all pleasures, and avoiding all pains. There are many pleasures, which are incompatible, and of these, by a rule of Philosophy, as well as of common sense the greatest is to be chosen, as of pains

the least. Thus no small part of our Happiness consists in undergoing one degree of pain to avoid a greater. If our child should fall in the fire, we readily expose ourself to the danger of being burnt, to avoid the far superior pain which would have tormented us, had we not saved our child. Thus to abstain from inferior pleasures and to submit to inferior pains constitute great part of our Happiness.

Lecture 51st

As Happiness is the common end of all our pursuits, it must necessarily be a subject of all others, the most important. + Many false opinions have been formed with regard to this, which circumstance tends to promote the good of society, for by it we are led to act different parts, and follow different pursuits in Life. Notwithstanding of this, some rules may be laid down, which are applicable to all men, and which may serve

to direct us wherein to place that standard of Happiness ~~to~~ at which we endeavour to arrive. In order to this I yesterday made some introductory remarks, the first of which was, that Happiness is an attribute of sentient nature alone. Thus we cannot say that a tree is happier than a house, or a house than a tree, but we can safely say that one animal is happier than another. I further observed that we are apt to imagine that there is no state of Happi-

ness to which all men can attain, as their dispositions are so various; and on this opinion are founded proverbs in different languages, as, trahit sua quemque voluntas in the Latin, in the French il ne faut pas disputer le goût, and in our own, every man to his mind. This however is a mistake, for as every man however perfect is capable of improvement, and every man however defective is capable of removing his defects in some measure, we ought to set up

a model to ourselves, the nearest to which whoever can approach, will be the happiest man. I do not account those happy who are content with animal gratifications, for in this case their contentment does not indicate their Happiness but meanness. I already observed that Happiness does not consist in attaining to every enjoyment, and avoiding every suffering; we must endure certain pains, and forego certain pleasures. When the sportsman is asked wherein lies his pleasure, he will recount to you the toils

and dangers which he has undergone in the chace. Were a freedom from all pain, and a possession of every pleasure to constitute Happiness, our nature must necessarily be changed, for in this case there would be no room for those passions which are natural to man. Except we have once experienced a certain pain, we never can be sensible of the joy which arises from escaping an analogous pain. As intellectual pleasures as well as pains greatly surpass animal, we ought to forego an animal pleasure for

an intellectual, when they come in competition. Our pains may be divided in to three Heads, viz unexpected pains, secondly those which admit of a choice, and thirdly, such as we voluntarily submit to, to avoid greater. The same degree of pain when it comes unexpectedly upon us affects us in a very different manner from what it does when we are apprised of it. Our apprehensions are apt to magnify, and make it appear greater than it really is. Thus the patient often

starts from the instruments of the Surgeon before it is applied, when the operation of performed before he knew of it would have affected him with little or no pain. Although obloquy and contempt are the causes of pain it is little when compared to that occasioned by remorse and consciousness of having done amiss. In this case then we ought easily to be led to make our choice. If for example to defend a just man, we must incur the displeasure of a knave, the ge-

neral rule, to undergo the pain in or
der to avoid a greater applies here, we
ought to undergo the inconvenience
which may arise from the displeasures
of the knave, to avoid the far superior
pain and uneasinesſ, which woulds be
occasioned by the remorse, and the con-
sciousneſ of having failed in our
Duty to a man of Justice and In-
tegrity. As Happineſs is of the greatest
importance we ought to be attentive in
making our choice.

Lecture 52

When our active nature is equally urged by the Experience and Apprehension of pain, with pleasure, we must incur pain in our attainment to Happiness. For, as I formerly observed, unless we have experienced a certain degree of pain we never can be sensible of the joy which arises from escaping an analogous degree of pain. Let us enquire on what depends the state of mans least suffering and greatest enjoyment. I may observe

by the way, that by state I do not here mean any particular situation, or temporary condition, but the whole course of a man's life. In order to determine the present question, it will be necessary to look back to the physical History of our Nature. Animal pains, which tend to the preservation of Life are wisely and necessarily out of our power. But this is not the case with our other sufferings; for example, the suffering which arises from a malignity of temper is in our own power, and may be avoided.

Since animal Pains are necessary and unavoidable, that which constitutes the least suffering with regard to them is Fortitude. As this is a principal part of Happiness, we ought to try to attain to it, at the expence of all other enjoyments and sufferings. As the fear and apprehension of external evils is a great barrier to Fortitude, we ought to engage our minds so in laudable pursuits, as not to leave room for this fear and apprehension. As Happiness is independant of external objects, we enquire after it in

the History of our nature. In order to
to this it will be necessary to consider
the six rules which I laye down when
I was treating of pleasure. The first was
that the use of things salutary and re-
quisite to animal preservation is plea-
sant; what is pernicious is painful.
with regard to Animal pleasures, the
enjoyment which is from them is transi
tory, and any attempts to prolong it prove
abortive. Some men falsy attribute plea
sures which spring from a nobler sourse
to Animal enjoyments. Thus they refer-

the enjoyment arising from society and conversation to the pleasures of the table. It is not the man who indulges most in animal gratifications, but he who is most temperate in the use of them, that derives the greatest enjoyment from them. Temperance then is a principal constituent of Happiness. The second rule which I layed down under pleasure was, that the sense of any perfection is pleasant, of any defect painful. But this must be taken in a limited sense, for if we should look upon Dress, Equipage, and

the like as constituents of perfection, we become proud, and insolent, and consequently wretched. It is only when we look upon Justice, Candour, Generosity &c as perfections, that we derive Happiness from our apprehension of perfection. By the third rule we are taught that Affection is pleasant, and Hatred painful. The man who has good parents and Brothers affectionate relations, dutiful children and worthy neighbours is commonly pronounced happy. But although we enjoy all these advantages, except we ourselves be of an affectionate & loving temper we

cannot be happy. If the man who hates his friends and connections, be unhappy, how much more so must he be, who bears an universal grudge at Mankind, which is scattered over the whole globe; he may, 'tis true, retire from them to the pathless forest where the Human foot never trode, but he can no where retire from the malignity of his own Temper. Joy and Hope are pleasant, whereas Grief and Fear are painful. Our Happiness in this case depends greatly on the different manners in which we

are affected by these passions. Those who are moderately affected by those, have a better chance for Happiness, than those who are violently agitated by them. The fifth rule is, that Exercise of the Mind or Body is pleasant. It is the common opinion, that those men who have something to do are happy. But we may be active and have something to do, & yet be far from Happiness. It is only when we are engaged in laudable pursuits, as the good of our country or of Man

kind, that we can be accounted happy,
with regard to Exercise. In the sixth
and last rule I have observed that Ha-
bit in some instances can change the
source of pleasures or pains. Our
Happiness in this case depends upon
the Habits which we have acquired. Those
who have the best chance for Happiness
are such as have acquired Habits of
activity in virtuous and laudable
pursuits; whereas those who by Habit
have addicted themselves to Indolence and
animal Gratification, will never be happy-

Lecture 53

We have found that to bear up under animal pains with fortitude, to act with a strenuous mind in the station in which we are placed in life, to be temperate & just constitutes the greatest enjoyment. With regard to our external condition, we ought to resign ourselves to the will of God, and ~~xxxx~~ with regard to our fellow creatures we ought to behave in. Happiness depends on the mind alone; to the man who has not the requisites to happiness in his mind, Prosperity and Adversity are matters of indifference;

he will be equally wretched in both situations. I am of opinion that Epictetus who was a slave, was as happy as Epaminondas, Tie, Titus, or Trajan who were Emperors. all of them had the constituents of Happiness within them; the Difference of their external conditions produced no difference in its. It hath however been objected that this Happiness independant of external objects is imaginary. In order to answer this objection we would be lis to consider how far the attainments of human nature can reach. But before I proceed to this, I shall shew how

for the care of one's self may be look-
ed upon as a part of virtue. If we ac
count the proper cultivation of our Mind
the care of our self, this is not only a
part, but the whole of virtue. For by it
we promote the good of Mankind. But
if by the care of our self we mean merely
the preservation of Life, this is no part
of virtue. Our Life is only so far good,
as it is well employed; that of a Dæmon
is an evil, whereas that of an Angel is
a good to society. As the modern wri-
ters on Moral Philosophy, have been

for the most part Lawyers, the question wherein consists the chief good or Happi-
ness. They have been led by their Sophistry has been overlooked
on to refer it to external objects, on which it does not at all depend. The ancients however did not neglect this Question, but they differed in their opinions. Aristippus placed the chief good in mere animal gratification, and was followed in his opinion by Epicurus who pretended to refine that Philosophy, and founded a considerable sect which bears his name. When they were pushed to give a Definition of

this Philosophy, they, gave out that they did not mean animal pleasures, but the nobler attainments of the mind. Be this as it will, it had a very bad influence on the followers of Epicurus. Cæsar was an Epicurean, but the activity and impetuosity of his temper hindered him from devoting himself to sloth and indolence, this Philosophy however had this bad effect upon him, that it made him imagine all the rest of mankind created merely for him. Atticus was likewise an Epicurean, and was led by his principles to retire, when the interest of his country ought to

have induced him to stand in its defence in the struggle between Caesar & the Liberty.

Lecture 54th

It appears from our reasoning on this subject, that that which is excellent in our nature constitutes Happiness. We ought to take care that the opinion which we form of excellence be just, for except this be the case we cannot be Happy. There are some who think that pleasure constitutes excellence, but this opinion is false, for the consciousness of excellence is previous to the pleasure

arising from it; the sentiment of approbation is prior to the pleasure which we derive from it. In order to be Happy we must be well affected not only to the rational part, but to the whole of God's creation, and say with the emperor Antoninus, O beautiful order of the world, what ever is agreeable to thee shall be so to me, thy seasons shall not come too soon or too late for me. In the whole course of our reasoning on this subject, I have avoided the use of such terms as are not applicable to virtues which have been

really found in the characters of some men. When we talk of the perfection of of Human nature, the Question always occurs, to what degree of it a man ever arrived. And it has been objected to Moral Philosophy that it sets up a standard of perfection which it is impossible to arrive at. But we ought here to remember the distinction between Physical and Moral Science; it is the business of moral Science to point out a model or standard of perfection to which we ought to endeavour to attain. So this different men approach in different degrees according to their

different faculties whether original or adventitious. But besides these, the different forms of government under which mankind live, qualify them in different degrees to approach to the standard of perfection. Let us suppose a state where all the members are on a footing of equality; then will they be free, generous, and candid, every man will have a proper respect for his neighbour, because none is in so high a condition as to become insolent, and none in so low a condition as to become servile and dependant. Discretionary Power for the most part produces Insolence, Pride, and Ill

ranny in him who is possessed of it, and meanness, servility, and Abjection in those who live under his sway. We ought then to be cautious what opinions we form of government, as men of the greatest genius have been misled with regard to this; as for example Mr Pope in those two lines,

{ Let fools for modes of government contest
{ The best administered is always best.

betrayed more ignorance and thoughtlessness than could have been expected from a man of his judgement, or even from one who is capable of exerting the least degree of thought.

Lecture 55th

I was last considering the influence which different forms of government have upon the characters of men. I shall go on to mention some other circumstances which likewise tend to produce differences in their characters. With regard to this Religion has a particular influence. Those who live where the true Religion is established, have the means of Happiness, in a much greater degree than those who are unlucky as to live where Super

stition, or false opinions with regard to Religion take place. The tendencies of the true Religion and Superstition are diametrically opposite; those who live under the influence of the former, are led to love and promote the good of their fellow creatures, while those who have lived under the influence of the latter have been induced to perpetrate the most barbarous and inhuman crimes, from a mistaken notion of their Duty. Different forms of government and different institutions of Religion have the same effect in producing differences in the characters of collective Bodies,

as in those of individuals. Nations as well as single persons, have something particular in their characters. There is another circumstance which has a considerable influence upon the characters of men, viz. Education. The greatest attention ought to be paid to this, as it is a matter of the greatest importance; the Habits which we acquire in youth necessarily forming our future character in Life. I am apt to imagine that too little regard is paid to the acquisition of such Habits as will render us happy,

and that too much time is spent in the mere study of Languages. As children are commonly sooner confirmed in their habits than we are aware of, we ought to be extremely cautious what examples we set before them. I am of opinion that severity is not proper in training up youth, and ought only to be applied in the case of mean and servile offences, as sporting with the calamities of our fellow creatures, and the like; when they behave like slaves, then ought they

to be punished like slaves. When we are treating of Education, the Question always occurs, whether Publick or Private Education is preferable. Many learned men have been divided in their sentiments with regard to this; I am however inclined to side with those who stand up for Publick Education. Those who give the preference to private, alledge that young men have hereby a greater chance to be virtuous, as they will more probably avoid those vices,

which are so frequently practiced in places of publick resort. I doubt not however but vices of a more atrocious nature than these are acquired by those who are educated in private; they are apt to become insolent, by seeing nothing but the stately pride of the master, and the abject obedience of the servant. They are likewise in danger of falling into Indolence and Inactivity, as they have no body on an equal footing with themselves, to excite their emulation. And when they come into the world, they are unacquainted

with those vices which prevail in it, and not knowing their fatal effects, will be apt to fall into them. So that I apprehend that it is better to be early acquainted with them.

Lecture 56th

We have found that original capacity, acquired Habits, Government, Religion, and Education have an influence upon the characters of men; but besides these there is another circumstance which tends to produce a Difference; viz. persons

nal reflection. By this Socrates who liv
ed in a corrupted state was possessed of
candour, justice, and wisdom. In the same
manner Epaminondas whose native coun
trey was one of the most inconsiderable
states in Greece, and who consequently
could not live under the best form of go
vernment, or where the best manners took
place, distinguished himself for every vir
tue. We have likewise instances of this
kind among the Romans, as Cato and Bru
tus, and Helvidius, Tacitus, and Seneca;
who maintained the most unblemished

character amidst the greatest corruption. Personal reflection influenced the character of Epictetus who was a slave as well as those of Antoninus, Trajan, the two Vespasians, and Nerva who were Emperors. There have likewise been some great men in our own country, to whom we owe our constitution of government, whom personal reflection renderee models for every virtue. The most general and comprehensive rule with regard to our conduct, is, that when once we know what is good and happy, we ought to pursue it, with

unremitted arrow. In this pursuit we ought to take care that we are not misled by the sentiments of the vulgar. In Sparta and Rome, where publick spirit prevailed, we could not be in the wrong though we followed the common opinion. But in modern times where a regard to private interest takes place, more caution is required. Every nation as well as every individual has its peculiar follies. Where property is established, every wise man ought to manage what belongs to himself to the best advantage. But his

happiness here does not ~~here~~ consist in his being possessed of the property, but in the wisdom of managing it to advantage and in the power of relieving the wants of others. Yet many men misapply their property, in the same manner as a general may be perfectly master of all those arts which are necessary to the carrying on of war, and at the same time a wretch, unhappy, and miserable. That which constitutes the greatest Happiness is Love to God, and to his works. No vulgar opinion ought to have so great an influ-

ence upon us as to make us neglect this.
We are not however so favourably dis
posed towards our fellow creatures, as we
ought to be. We are apt to look upon
them with an envious and jealous eye,
and with an air of contempt, under the pre
tence of being shocked at their folly and
corruption. But this is not judging with
candour; it was not so that Socrates view
ed the corruption of his countrymen, but
with pity and compassion, he endeavour
ed to the utmost of his power to reclaim
them from their vicious practices, and

honourably lost his Life in the attempt. Our Envy and Contempt are the sources of Misery to ourselves alone, and the more we give way to them, the more unhappy will we be. We are likewise apt to excuse our want of Liberality and Generosity, by the ingratitude of mankind even though we never experienced it. But we ought not to be hindered by this for although the objects of our Beneficence prove ungrateful, we have done our Duty and in doing so we promote our own Happiness. In seeking after this, we are apt

to be misled by frivolous pursuits, and amusements. As we have found ~~that~~ by the fullest induction of particulars that that animal enjoyments constitute no part of our Happiness, they must necessarily be an interruption to it. They deserve our attention only so far as they tend to the preservation of life. Those things which constitute real Happiness, ought to be the objects of our pursuit. I have now done with the first part of Moral Science, viz that which relates to the Mind and Happiness of man

and I hope from what has been said upon it, that I have furnished you not only with arguments to reason upon the subject, but likewise with rules by which you may regulate your conduct. I shall in the next place go on to the second part of Moral Science, viz. that which relates to the external condition and conduct of man, or his relations and Duties in civil Life.

Lecture 57th

External actions are the surest proofs of the sentiments of the Heart.

Shew by acts of kindness and benevolence to our fellow creatures, we shew the sentiments of our heart to be love to mankind, justice, candour, and the like. The Sentiment or intention alone constitutes the Morality or Immorality of an action. This I shall illustrate by a few examples. Suppose a man should walk across a field, without doing either good or evil in the least degree, I apprehend that that action is perfectly indifferent. But if in walking across he had tread down the corn of the the Farmer, then the ac-

tion would have ~~in~~ morally evil. If however he did it with an intention to drive of some noxious vermin, the action becomes morally good. But if we suppose that the man in these three cases walked in his sleep, there was no intention, and consequently there could no moral good or evil. If again in India a man should fire at his enemy from behind a bush, and instead of hitting him should hit a Tyger which was ready to spring at him, although the action turned out well, it still was morally evil, as the intention was evil;

Ferguson Notes

"a little ingenious author, see J.S, reference to

the economic study must be before W of N.

Dating: Between Steuart's Inquiry + Smith's Wealth

Provenance: Steuart's notes of lectures, written up of tutorials. Lectures were given around, & notes written up with references, & the printed ~~notes~~ set of notes issued by Ferguson (i.e., the so-called Institutes of Moral Philosophy, but an earlier edition than the one you have – probably the 1st edn. of 1769, but this could be checked)

bf. p. 503 of NS with p. 175 of your edn. of the Inst.

Interesting Internals

(1) On four stages theory – rather like the Essay.

(2) About the source of profit in the economics part – particularly p. 447 of NS.

(3) Internal on 2nd page of NS, about "similar causes produce similar effects", specifically relating this to Newton.

These may be in the 1st edn of the Institutes – I can't remember.

See, eg, reference to "typographical error" on p. 10 of NS, which gives an obvious clue